digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

1989

Class Actions and Client-Centered
Decisionmaking
Lawrence M. Grosberg
New York Law School, lawrence.grosberg@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Recommended Citation
40 Syracuse L. Rev. 709 (1989)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

CLASS ACTIONS AND CLIENT-CENTERED
DECISIONMAKING
Lawrence M. Grosberg*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

710

II.

CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING .......................

715
715
716
716
717
719
722

A.
B.
C.
D.

III.

CLASS ACTIONS ......................................

A.
B.

IV.

Traditional Client-Lawyer Model ............
1969 and 1983 Ethics Codes Changes ........
1. Client Control ..........................
2. Information Dispensing Requirement .....
Reasons for Client Involvement .............
Two Hypotheticals .........................
1. Bringing Individual Actions: The Decisionmaking Process .........................
2. Bringing Class Actions: The Decisionmaking Process.............................
Doctrinal Rationale ........................
Procedural Rules Relating to Client Decisionmaking in Class Actions ....................
1. Rule 23(a)(4) ...........................
a. Conflicts of Interest ................
b. Adequacy of Named Plaintiff........
2. Rule 23(e) ..............................
3. Rules 23(d)(2) and (3) ..................
4. Communication With Class Members .....
5. Limitations of ProceduralRules .........

APPLICATION

OF

CLIENT-CENTERED

*

727
732
732
734
735
735
737
738
745
748
750

DECISIONMAKING

VALUES IN CLASS ACTIONS ...........................

A.

723

Confronting Group Conflict .................

751
752

Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. I want to express my gratitude for

the thoughtful suggestions of David Binder, Lewis Steel, Philip Tegeler, and Donald Zeigler;
the able research assistance of Daphne Williams, Roosevelt Nesmith and Jack Jordan, and
the excellent wo :d processing of Lisa Waite.

Syracuse Law Review

B.

[Vol. 40:709

Client-CenteredLawyering From the Outset of
A Class Attorney's Work ...................

V.

1. Pre-Filing (Conflicts Not Yet Apparent),
a. Consent of Named Plaintiffs ........
b. Similar Amorphous Clients ..........
i. The Decisionmakerfor a Child .
ii. The Decisionmaker for a Mentally Incompetent Client ........
c. Outreach to Members of Putative
Class ...... ......................
i. Rationale ..................
ii. Class Lawyer Steps ............
iii. Judicial Steps.................
2. Post-Filing (Pre- and Post-Class Certification) ............... ..................
C. The Class Action Lawyer ..................
1. Need for Realistic Ethical Rule ..........
2. Proposed Ethical Code Provision.........
3. Dual Lawyer-FiduciaryRole Not Unusual
4. Feasibility of Class Lawyer as Fiduciary.
CONCLUSION .... ... .............................
I.

753

754
754
758
758
761
763
763
768
771
773
775
775
777
781
785
787

INTRODUCTION

Most class action litigators do not believe that client control or
even client consent is required in the conduct of a class action. A
class of hundreds or thousands of individuals cannot control a class
action and often cannot even make its individual voices heard.
Class action commentators have called the class device a "subversive element" in the traditional context of "individual party control,"' and have charged that the tension caused by class actions
"produces . . . contortions in the way we otherwise think about

litigation." 2 But it is clear that adherence to a rigid requirement of

1. Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective
Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561, 562 (1987). Professor Rosenberg further writes: "[glenerally, there is
no reality to the notion that claimants have significant personal influence or involvement,
let alone control regarding the course of litigation and settlement other than wielding some
degree of ultimate veto power over the settlement price." Id. at 582 n.86.
2. S.C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS AcTION 7
(1987).
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individual consent would effectively destroy class actions.3 The
governing procedural4 and ethical rules 5 do not define the relative
roles of the lawyer and the client(s) in making important decisions
in class actions and the decisional law addresses the issues only
when there are open and notorious conflicts among the clients and
lawyers.' To the extent there are rules, they have been accurately
characterized as schizophrenic. 7 At best, the courts approach these
decisionmaking issues in a reactive and ad hoc way."
When the conflicts among clients and lawyers are not immediately apparent, there is simply no official guidance. It is unclear
whether the client should play any decisionmaking role, how the
client should play such a role, what if anything the class lawyers
must or should do to facilitate client participation' and even who
the client is. In contrast, the decisionmaking responsibilities of the
lawyer and client in the typical individual client-lawyer relation-

3. Cf. Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91 n.172 (utility of class actions
would be "greatly diminished").
4. For purposes of this Article, governing procedural rules mean the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and in particular Rule 23. Nothing in Rule 23 directly deals with the decisionmaking roles of clients or lawyers (see FED. R. Civ. P. 23); Rules 23(a)(4), 23(d)(2),
23(d)f3) and 23(e), however, implicitly affect these matters. See infra notes 94-192 and accompanying text.
5. Neither the Model Code of Professional Responsibility nor the Model Rules of Professional Conduct explicitly delineate the role of the "client" in class actions, numerous
provisions in both ethical codes do deal with the decisionmaking role of clients generally
and with the subject of conflicts of interest between clients and lawyers. See infra notes 2542 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., infra notes 109-29 and accompanying text. See generally Rhode, Class
Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982) (comprehensive discussion of applicable case law relating to resolution of open conflicts in class actions and suggestions as to
how lawyers and courts can try to accommodate such differences).
7. See Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Actions Part II: Interest, Class and
Representation, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1067 (1980); see also G. HAZARD & J. VETTER, PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 218 (1987).
8. See H. NEWBERO, CLASS ACTIONS, §§ 15.02, 15.03 (2d ed. 1985); cf. Kane, Of Carrots
and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEx. L. REV. 385 (1987).
Professor Kane wrote that the courts have not been very "creative" in dealing with these
decisionmaking issues. See Kane, supra at 399. She concluded that a more effective partnership is necessa, between the class lawyer and the court and that the court should assume a
more active monitoring role in managing class actions. Whereas Professor Kane is concerned
principally with more efficient management of the class action and how the class lawyer may
be induced to aid in the accomplishment of that goal, the focus here is on whether and how
client-centered values can be better reflected in effectively conducted class actions.
9. I refer to steps beyond notice to members of the class after a Rule 23(b)(3) certification (giving members an opportunity to opt out) or a Rule 23(e) notice of settlement hearing
(giving members an opportunity to state an objection to a proposed settlement).
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ship are dealt with explicitly in the ethical codes. 10 In addition,
considerable commentary addresses both the individual client's
role and the lawyering skills necessary to achieve client-centered
decisionmaking. 1
The principle of informed consent is now firmly imbedded in
our governing ethical norms. 12 Clients, at least individual clients,
must be given enough information so that they can meaningfully
consent to the actions that lawyers take on their behalf. Clientcentered decisionmaking, as a mode or style of lawyering, takes the
doctrine of informed consent a few steps further and urges the lawyer to involve the client more actively in the decisionmaking process." Clients should not simply accede to the lawyers' decisions or
even passively consent, but rather should actually participate in
making the key decisions affecting their legal rights. 14 More partic-

10. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980) (the authority to make decisions [affecting the merits] is exclusively that of the client) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1983) (a lawyer shall
abide by a client's decision concerning the objectives of representation) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. The outer bounds of client control are, of course, the lawfulness and morality of
those directives. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 38-42, 151-52 (1978).
11. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENTCENTERED APPROACH 147-53 (1977) (leading law school text on teaching the skills required to
implement client-centered lawyering); Ellman, Lawyer and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717
(1987) (critique of some of the Binder and Price techniques for being too manipulative of
the client); Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and NegotiationModels: Preserving
Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA REV. 811 (1987) (analysis
of how client-centered counseling can be integrated into skillful negotiation without undermining the efficacy of either the counseling or the negotiation); Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41
(1979) (comprehensive examination of origins of the doctrine of informed consent and its
application to the lawyer-client relationship); Tremblay, On Persuasion and Paternalism:
Client Decisionmaking the Questionably Competent Client 1987 UTAH L. REV. 515 (thorough discussion of the considerable difficulties a lawyer faces when deciding whether to follow the directions of a client, seek appointment of a guardian, thereby excluding the client
altogether, or follow lawyer's own conception of what is in the client's interest); R. Dinerstein, How Lawyers Present Choices to Their Clients: Some Notes on Putting ClientCenteredness Theory Into Practice (May 1, 1987) (unpublished paper presented to Columbia Law School Clinical Theory Workshop, May 1, 1987) (presentation to client of choices
which had not been contemplated by the client may be done without violating client-centered values). This Article is in the same vein as all of these recent analyses of aspects of
client-centered lawyering-how the doctrine of client-centered decisionmaking applies or
fits into the context of class actions.
12. See infra notes 25-63 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 147-53.

14. There are contrasting views that posit a more authoritarian conception of the lawyer's role and concomitantly a much less central (if not non-existent) role for the client. See
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ularly, the clients, not their lawyers, should weigh the various nonlegal consequences of a course of action.
This Article examines whether client-centered norms may appropriately be applied to the class action, and particularly, the relevance of those client-focused concerns when the class members
are passive or reticent. The client-even the notion of a client-is
different in a class action. An individual client can be the primary
decisionmaker. If the lawyer gives the proper information to the
typical client and if the lawyer facilitates the client's consideration
of non-legal factors, and, of course, if the client is not seeking to
accomplish unlawful goals, the client can make key decisions such
as whether to file suit, where to file, whom to sue, and whether to
settle.1 5 Class action clients, by contrast, cannot collectively be the
primary decisionmaker, especially if the class is large or its members have conflicting interests. How then can a class action lawyer

abide by the wishes of the client(s)? Is it possible to follow clientcentered norms without destroying the class action? I believe it is
possible, but recognize that a class lawyer must reach out affirmatively to listen to the views of the representative class members,
and at the same time, play a larger decisionmaking role in a class
action than in a case involving an individual client.'6

D. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE 13-19 (1974). Rosenthal describes the
traditional paternalistic view of the lawyer's role; Rosenthal's own model for the lawyerclient relationship is what he calls a "participatory approach" which is similar to the clientcentered model set forth in the work by Binder and Price (supra note 11). For a view,
somewhat in the middle, see Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV.
469, 485-86 (1984), where it is suggested that there ought to be vigorous, non-hierarchical
dialogue between client and lawyer, but that ultimately the lawyer takes the lead in making
the key decisions.
15. In a recent article, Professor Simon proposed a model of discretionary ethical decisionmaking for lawyers which adds a major factor-whether the lawyer's assistance will further justice-and then, implicitly, with respect to decisionmaking, gave the primary if not
exclusive role for making all key decisions to the lawyers. See Simon, Ethical Discretion In
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
16. Though it frequently is difficult to generalize about class actions, I will attempt to
do so in this Article. I proceed on the presumption that class actions not only are an existing
part of our procedural system but are crucial to the effective operation of our judiciary and
to the assurance of utilizable remedies to multiple victims of wrongdoing. There certainly
are debates, however, as to the efficacy of class actions of a particular type, or at least as to
the adequacy of current rules for a particular type. Compare Coffee, Rescuing the Private
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42
MD. L. REV. 215 (1983) with Rosenberg, supra note 1 (regarding their respective negative
and positive views as to the efficiency and desirability of mass tort class actions). Nevertheless, this Article will try to examine generally, the decisionmaking roles of class client(s) and
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Indeed, the class lawyer and not the clients must make the
decisions in class actions. But because there is no individual client
who can determine the course of a class action, it is doubly important that a class lawyer reach out to a sampling of class members
to ascertain its views and feelings on a variety of non-legal considerations about which only clients should voice opinions. It is necessary to alter the concept of the class lawyer's duties and obligations. Instead of acting as an advocate and advisor, the lawyer
must be an advocate and guardian of the class. 17 To effectuate this
change, the applicable ethical and procedural rules should be revised. These revisions should address not only cases when conflicts
are blatant among class members, class representatives or class
lawyers, but also cases when conflicts or differences of opinion are
quiescent and not readily apparent. 8
In both situations the class lawyer should act in a way that
reflects proper respect for individual class members (even those
whose reticence and passivity requires skillful client-centered lawyering to encourage active client participation), and yet, also reflects
the lawyer's duty to mediate and ultimately to act in the best interests of the class. In the case of the passive class, the wishes or
opinions of class members, because generally unstated, presumably
will not even be known to the class lawyer, or the court for that
matter. This may be so whether the silent class members disagree
or agree with a particular course of action proposed or taken by
the class lawyer. Some reticent class members may have a unique
or even an irrational view point about litigation. 9 In most class

class lawyers.
17. As Professor Simon has written, there ought not to be a presumption that the mere

fact of differences among class members means dissipation of an effective class action. See
Simon, supra note 14, at 480-81. A fundamental responsibility of the class lawyer in this
context may be to act vigorously to try to resolve the differences, and then, in any event, to
take action in her trustee capacity in accordance with her views as to the best interests of
the class.
18. See Rhode, supra note 6; infra notes 227-35 and accompanying text; see also
Piambino v. Barley, 757 F.2d 1112, 1145 (1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1169 (1986).
Cf. Ricciuti, Equity and Accountability in the Reform of Settlement Procedures in Mass
Tort Cases: The Ethical Duty to Consult, 1 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 817 (1988) (author concludes there is too much abuse of the class action device and proposes with respect to settlement of mass tort class actions that a "consultation unit," composed of class members, be
used by the class lawyer so that the court's guardianship role may be better performed).
19. See, e.g., N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT (1971); see also infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
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actions today, the views of passive class members are almost never
considered by other class members, counsel, or the court.
This Article will suggest ways to achieve at least some of the
goals of informed consent and client-centered decisionmaking in
class actions and yet preserve, if not enhance, the strength and vitality of this important procedural device. Part II reviews the incorporation of client-centered lawyering norms into the ethical
rules of the profession, and explains the moral and practical reasons underlying this development. Part III addresses the rationale
of class actions and discusses specific provisions of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 that might be used to further client-centered
lawyering. Finally, Part IV considers several ways to implement
client-centered values in class actions and argues for an expansion
of the class lawyer's authority to act on behalf of the class. By
gathering more information from class members, the lawyer can
properly act as a fiduciary for the class. I propose an ethics code
provision that would effectuate these suggestions.
II.

A.

CLIENT-CENTERED LAWYERING

Traditional Client-Lawyer Model

Traditionally, most lawyers made all of the important decisions for their clients.20 Supporters of this approach defend it on
several grounds: it is what the client wants and expects; 2 1 it is more
efficient and therefore less costly than conducting time-consuming
client interviews;22 the lawyer, as the professional, unquestionably
knows what is best, and professional autonomy ought not to be
constrained in any way.2 3
Very practical notions of lawyering underlie the traditional approach. Lawyers related to clients in the way that seemed most

20. Empirical and anecdotal evidence confirm that this approach was the norm. See D.
ROSENTHAL, supra note 14, at 13-19.

21. Id.; cf. Epstein, Medical Malpractice:The Case for Contract, 1976 Law and Social
Inquiry, AM B. FOUND. RES. J. 87 (with respect to the role of patients, author concludes it is
essentially a question of contract reflecting the patient's expectations and desires). For a
thorough critique of Epstein's view, see Spiegel, supra note 11, at 78-85; see also A. BENJAMIN, THE HELPING INTERVIEw 34-37 (1974).
22. But sec Spiegel, supra note 11, at 110-12.
23. Id. at 114-17; cf. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads and
New Paths-A Dead End, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9, 33-37, 46-49 (1986). In criminal defense
work, the argument is made that defendants may not unduly interfere with the lawyer's
representation. Professor Berger essentially accepts the validity of the argument. See id.

716
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efficient and consonant with lawyers' perceptions of their standing
and role in society.2 4 Regulation of the relationship was minimal at
best. Aside from prohibitions against criminal conduct and fraud,
lawyers were free to relate to clients as they chose. Substantive and
procedural law and the ethics codes neither approved nor prohibited this authoritarian mode of lawyering. The law and the codes
simply did not address the matters. The client under this model
was an unavoidable distraction to be tolerated at best and totally
manipulated at worst. Put bluntly, lawyers did not accord clients
much human dignity and autonomy unless a powerful client demanded decisionmaking authority or the occasional lawyer gave his
client the power.
B.

1969 and 1983 Ethics Codes Changes

1. Client Control
The paternalistic vision of the dominant lawyer did not begin
to change until 1969, when the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code) was promulgated. Ethical Consideration (EC) 7-7 of the
Code stated that the authority to make decisions "affecting the
merits" of a case rested "exclusively" with the client.2 5 While considerable ambiguity remained as to what decisions affected the
merits and the scope of a lawyer's discretion, 26 EC 7-7 significantly
changed the nature of the client-lawyer relationship. The requirement of informed client consent as a lawyering norm became

24. See D. ROSENTHAL,supra note 14, at 13, 22.
25. MODEL CODE EC 7-7. This provision reads in principal part as follows:
[iun certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or
substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions
on his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the
client and, if made within the framework of the law, such decisions are binding on
his lawyer ...."
Id. Ethical Consideration 7-8 states, inter alia: "[i]n the final analysis, however, the lawyer
should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or
methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client and not for himself." Id.
26. The lawyer's unilateral decisionmaking authority clearly is not limited to purely
ministerial matters. See, e.g., MODEL CODE EC 7-9.
[ijn the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which are for his
determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer should always act in a
manner consistent with the best interests of his client. However, when an action in
the best interest of his client seems to him to be unjust, he may ask his client for
permission to forego such action.
Id.; accord Spiegel, supra note 11, at 66-67.
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firmly established. Lawyers tried to use the substance-procedure
dichotomy to decide which decisions affected the merits.2 7 As in
other contexts, however, the line between substance and procedure
proved illusive and hard to define.2 8 The courts have gone both
ways on such issues as whether it is procedural or substantive to
decide to call a witness to testify, 29 to waive an issue for trial,30 or
to cross-examine a witness. 3 1 Nevertheless, EC 7-7 was a real step
32
forward because it endorsed the principle of informed consent.
The recently promulgated Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules) continue the approach of the Code.3 3
2. Information Dispensing Requirement
Both the 1969 Code and the 1983 Model Rules require lawyers
to give relevant information to clients.34 This follows axiomatically,
for if the client is to make decisions affecting the merits of a case,
the client must have the information necessary to make those deci-

27. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 49-65.
28. Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are talked about as though they
defined a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course, "substance"
and "procedure" are the same key words to very different problems. Neither "substantive"
nor "procedure" represents the same variants. Each implies different variables depending
upon the particular problem for which they are used. See Guaranty Trust Co v. York, 326
U.S. 99, 108 (1945); cf. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 108 S. Ct. 2117 (1988).
29. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 48-49.
30. Compare Duffy v. Griffith, 206 Cal. App. 2d 780, 24 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1962) (counsel
can unilaterally withdraw an issue) with Harness v. Pacific Curtainwall Co. 235 Cal. App. 2d
485, 45 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1965) (client consent required to withdraw issue). These cases are
discussed in Spiegel, supra note 11, at 57-58.
31. Id. at 124 n.. Professor Spiegel argues that even this decision should be the client's, though he does say a client cannot tell the lawyer specifically how to cross-examine.
See id.
32. See supra note 25.
33. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.2(a): "[a lawyer] shall consult with the client as to the
means by which [the objectives] are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter ....
Id.
34. Regarding the dissemination of information, Model Code EC 7-8 reads as follows:
[a] lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer
ought to initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so. Advice for
a lawyer to his client need not be confined to purely legal considerations. A lawyer
should advise his client of the possible effect of each legal alternative ....
Id. Rule 1.4 of the Model Rules states as follows: "[clommunication: (a) A lawyer shall keep
a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable request for information. (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." Id.
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sions. If the information is to be used effectively, the lawyer must
provide it in an understandable form. While there may be uncertainty as to the kind or amount of information the lawyer must
provide, the obligation to inform is unambiguous.3 5
The Model Rules have gone beyond the Code and have expanded the lawyer's obligation to give information to the client.3 6
In addition to the requirement that a lawyer "explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions," Rule 1.4(a) mandates that the lawyer "keep" a
client informed as to the status of the case and also that the lawyer
"promptly comply with a reasonable request for information. ' 's3
Further, the Model Rules are directive (in contrast to the precatory "ethical considerations" of the Code).38 Actual lawyering behavior, however, most likely lags behind all of these newly codified
rules, and the dominant lawyer model "probably" remains the
norm. As Dean Paul Carrington has stated: "[w]hile some have decried this attitude [of 'authoritarianism' and lawyer 'domination'
of the client], it is probably the norm for attorney-client relations
3' 9
in many areas of practice.

Unfortunately, however, the ethics codes generally speak of
the client in the lawyer-client relationship as if there were a single
prototypical client.40 This is a simplistic conception. Not only is
the named plaintiff in a class action different from a domestic relations client, but each is also qualitatively different from a corporate client, a mentally disabled client or an indigent criminal defendant. Indeed, for the district attorney who prosecutes criminal

35. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 68-72. The standard varies based on the sophistication and knowledge of the client. Id.
36. Compare MODEL CODE EC 7-8 with MODEL RULES Rule 1.4.
37. See supra note 34.
38. As the rules commentators stated with respect to the two key rules on client authority (Model Rules 1.2(a) and 1.4), there were "no direct counterparts in the Code of
Professional Responsibility." (The Code's client-centered norms, it should be recalled, are
contained only in the admonitory "ethical considerations" and not in the mandatory "disciplinary rules").
39. Carrington, The Right to Zealous Counsel, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1291, 1298; accord C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS

148 (1986). At least in the area of mass tort litigation,

recent empirical studies have shown that this dominant lawyer model still prevails. "A majority of the litigants felt they had little or no control over how their case was handled."
Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, at 8 (paper presented to AALS
Civil Procedure Section, January, 1989, New Orleans, La.). And most "attributed this to
their lawyer." Id. Ms. Hensler is employed at the RAND Corporation.
40. See supra notes 25, 33-34.
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defendants, it generally is said that there is no client at all, "except
the community at large," since the crime victim is in "no sense"
being represented by the district attorney. 41 The ethics codes recognize some, but not all of these differences. 42 Each of these "clients" cannot play the same role in deciding his respective legal
courses of action.
C. Reasons for Client Involvement
Several moral and pragmatic rationales have been offered in
support of the principle that clients, not their lawyers, make the
basic decisions affecting their legal rights or, at the very least, consent to the decisions. Perhaps most fundamentally, client-centered
decisionmaking reflects respect for the individual. 43 The integrity,
autonomy and dignity of the person is protected when clients make
the decisions affecting their lives. As the owner of a legal claim, the
client should have a "presumptive right of control. '44 It is "the client who will have to live with the outcome. '45 As Rosenthal points
out, even if the client simply ratifies the logically correct choice
proposed by the lawyer, the process of sharing decisionmaking responsibility psychologically reassures" the client. 0 On a more
pragmatic level, Rosenthal's major empirical study of the lawyerclient relationship demonstrates that clients are much more satisfied with and accepting of lawyering results (positive or negative)
when they participated in making the decisions that led to those
results. 4 7 It also seems indisputable that when a client is more actively involved in the decisionmaking process, the lawyer is better
informed and therefore makes better decisions. 4 Rosenthal concludes: "active participation can actually promote effective prob-

41. Uviller, Cops and Robbers, COLUMBIA

MAGAZINE

Feb. 18, 1988, at 6.

42. See infra notes 216-40 and accompanying text. At least with respect to children and
persons with disabilities, the Model Rules are a bit more forthright than the Model Code.

Compare MODEL

RULES

Rule 1.14 (Client Under a Disability) with

MODEL CODE

EC 7-12.

43. See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 1521, 23-24 (1975), excerpted in G. HAZARD & D. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 280 (1985) and S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE THE
AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 35 (1988) ("party control ... affirms individuality").

44. Spiegel, supra note 11, at 73.

45. D.

ROSENTHAL,

supra note 14, at 20.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 169; see also Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO.
L.J. 1015, 1045 (1981) (authoritarian lawyering model cultivates mistrust).
48. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 147-53, 197-210.
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lem solving ....[C]lients can.., fill gaps, catch mistakes.., and
help the professional . . .focus on the relevant aspects . . .,49
Finally, client decisionmaking ensures that non-legal factors (such
as the psychological or financial impact) are properly weighed by
the person best able to assess these consequences-the client.50
Interestingly, the increased recognition of the values of clientcentered decisionmaking occurred more or less at the same time
that critics assailed lawyers as the amoral agent of the disreputable
client, the so-called "hired guns." 51 But client-centered lawyering
does not require an attorney to carry out the wishes of the client
unquestioningly. Rather, the client-centered lawyer should skillfully present the client with choices that are based on clearly
stated legal opinions and then equally skillfully facilitate the client's consideration of the emotional or psychological consequences
of each option. 2 If a client then elects a course of action that is
illegal or immoral, the lawyer is not obliged to effectuate that
choice.5 3 While in one sense the client-centered lawyer is simply an
agent, she must not blindly acquiesce in a client's instructions regardless of their reasonableness, propriety, or legality. Commentators are correct, therefore, when they suggest that a good client-

49. D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 14, at 169.
50. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 148-50. "[Ljawyers cannot know what
value clients really place on various consequences ...clients' values are uniquely personal."
Id. Such values would include the economic, social or psychological consequences of a decision. "We therefore conclude that usually the lawyer should leave the final decision for the
client to make on the bases of the client's own intuitive weighing process." Id.
51. Compare Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031 (1975) with Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundation of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1061-65 (1976). Then-Professor Fried argued that the lawyer's assistance to clients to maintain their autonomy against the legal system (as long as it
is within the law) is the appropriate lawyering role even if the clients' position is not morally
admirable, and indeed even if it is contrary to the public interest. Fried, supra at 1080-82.
52. See Simon, supra note 15, at 1115-18.
53. See G. HAZARD, supra note 10, at 148-51. Professor Spiegel recently addressed the
issue of whether corporate clients are sufficiently strong and independent so that the doctrine of informed consent is inappropriate in the case of corporate clients. He is concerned
with the argument that informed consent simply becomes a lawyer's rationalization for the
immoral consequences of the action decided on by a corporate client. He concludes, however, that the solution is not to abandon informed consent but rather to put "limits on
lawyers participating in behavior that harms others." See Spiegel, Lawyers and Professional
Autonomy: Reflections on Corporate Lawyering and the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 9
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 139, 150 (1987). Professional control of a client's actions is not the
answer; rather the lawyers should have to assume responsibility for their own actions, their
own participation in the implementation of the corporate client's questionable actions. Id.
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centered lawyer can aggressively present every conceivable choice
to a client (even ones not contemplated by the client).54 Furthermore, a lawyer can vigorously debate with a client about the
proper course of action 5 or even can refuse to take a particular
course of action because it would produce an unjust result.5 6 Thus,
a lawyer can respect the client's decisionmaking authority without
' ' 57
becoming simply a "mouthpiece.
The development of client-centered lawyering followed similar
changes in the doctor-patient relationship.58 There also, the respect due the individual required the patient's participation in
medical treatment decisions. Ironically, lawyers first helped develop the medical malpractice law requiring doctors to obtain patients' consent,59 and only later applied the same principles to
their own legal practice. But lawyers, like other professionals, are
slow to impose additional obligations upon themselves. Nonetheless, the moral and practical reasons requiring informed consent
are similar in both fields. Both clients and patients are entitled to
control their own lives.60 Both lawyers and doctors will provide
better representation or treatment if the clients or patients participate actively. 1
As suggested above, while the concepts of informed consent
and client-centered decisionmaking are integrally related, they are
not the same. Assuming clients receive the proper information,
mere consent to a proposed course of action generally is a passive

54. See R. Dinerstein, supra note 11.
55. See Simon, supra note 14, at 488-89.
56. See Simon, supra note 15.
57. In some instances, even the client-centered lawyer may manipulate the client. See,
e.g., Trembla , supra note 11 (manipulation often is appropriate in the case of the incompetent client); cf. Ellman, supra note 11, at 753-78 (not all manipulation is bad).
58. See generally Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship:
The Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C.L. REV. 315 (1987).
59. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 42, 46-48. Despite resistance by many doctors,
changes also are occurring in the medical field and patients are becoming more involved in
their cases. See Strauss, supra note 58, at 342-43.
60. See generally Symposium on J. Katz, The Silent Doctor and Patient, 16 LAW,
MED. & HEAL'I H CARE 190-228 (1988). See also C. LIDz, A. MEISEL, E. ZERUBAVEL, M. CARTER,
R. SESTAK & L. ROTH, INFORMED CONSENT: A STUDY OF DECISIONMAKING IN PSYCHIATRY 10

(1984).
61. See id. at 11-23 (summary of standards and exceptions to doctrine of informed consent in medical area). Douglas Rosenthal, relying on works by Carl Rogers and Szasz &
Hollender, observed that psychoanalysts also "tend to agree that client participation per se
is constructive rather than harmful." D. ROSENTHAL, supra note 14, at 11.
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act. Client-centered decisionmaking, in contrast, is much more of a
participatory act by the client. The client's role can be viewed as a
three-step process. First, the client receives the requisite legal information, including legal opinions and an appropriate array of
choices.2 Second, with the guidance of the lawyer, the client
should evaluate the uniquely personal non-legal consequences of
each of the options. Third, the client should weigh the various legal and non-legal factors and then choose a course of action. Ideally, the client does not simply acquiesce to a lawyer's opinion, but
actively discusses the alternatives with the lawyer and then affirmatively makes a choice based on an assessment of the relative importance of the legal and non-legal consequences. If the lawyer is
cajoled into making a recommendation,6 3 at the least, then, the client consents, after having been fully informed of the bases for the
decision. While the ethics codes require informed consent by clients, they do not require the more participatory client-centered
decisionmaking.
D.

Two Hypotheticals

The difficulty in implementing the lawyering
norms-informed consent and client based decisionmaking-can
best be demonstrated by considering two hypothetical cases, one
involving racial discrimination and the other a toxic tort. 4 I will
first consider how the goals of informed consent and client-cen-

62. The lawyer's presentation of a particular choice (e.g. use of alternative dispute resolution to avoid litigation) may be viewed by some as manipulative; others see it as good,
aggressive client-centered lawyering. See, e.g., R. Dinerstein, supra note 11.
63. Some commentators have concluded that lawyers should give their view as to the
proper course of action only as a last resort, after all else has failed to persuade the client to
make the choice herself. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 154-55.
64. The two fact patterns are based on cases with which I have some familiarity; the
first is a housing discrimination claim similar to ones I have litigated, both on an individual
level (e.g. Brown v. Van Plaza, 15 Eq. Oppor. in Housing (P-H) 409 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15.
1981)), as well as class actions (e.g. Arthur v. Starrett City, 98 F.R.D. 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1983));
the second is a mass disaster claim similar to one I have used extensively in my teaching
(see Grosberg, The Buffalo Creek Disaster: An Effective Supplement to a Conventional
Civil Procedure Course, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 378 (1987)).
While there are many other types of class actions, the two examined here I)rovide :
useful context in which to consider the respective roles of lawyer and client in (las.s a'l iomn.
To the extent that different kinds of class actions require qualification of alny geiieralizin
tions I offer, I will so indicate; e.g., the reduced need for extended class member inlpl whi.l
the amounts of loss to each class member are minimal. See infra notes 265-69 anid , c-mlpa
nying text.
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tered decisionmaking can be achieved if the cases are brought on
behalf of one, or at most a few clients. I will then demonstrate how
much more difficult it is to achieve these goals if the cases are pursued as class actions.
Assume that Jack Smith visited Diane Greenblatt, a lawyer
with a public interest law office, in connection with a possible racial discrimination claim. Smith, a black man, explained that he
tried to rent an apartment in a 2500 unit complex in Queens, New
York. He submitted an application but he was never offered an
acceptable unit over a twelve month period. In addition, the apartment rental office refused to give him any clear indication as to
why he had not been given an apartment or when he might get
one. Smith was convinced he had been given a run-around because
of his race. Greenblatt arranged a test. She sent a white and a
black person, both with characteristics similar to Smith to the
complex to see if they were treated differently. The white person
was offered an apartment and the black person was not. Greenblatt
told Smith she would take his case.
In the second case, Daniel Morris consulted a private attorney,
John Bradley, regarding extremely bad odors in the backyard of
the Morris home. The Morris family members had become increasingly ill, and Daniel Morris was convinced that the odor was the
cause. After interviewing Morris, arranging for medical examination of the five members of the Morris family, and conducting toxicological investigations of the backyard, Bradley suspected that he
had discovered a Love Canal situation; that is, a disastrous toxic
tort attributable to chemical dumping by a large nearby chemical
manufacturer. One family member was in the incipient stages of
cancer. A second had stomach ailments. Both problems, doctors assured Bradley, were reasonably attributable to chemical leakage in
the backyard. Bradley agreed to represent the Morris family.
1. Bringing Individual Actions: The Decisionmaking Process
Assume that in both cases effective initial interviews were conducted and that preliminary investigations were completed. Greenblatt and Bradley had collected enough information to form legal
opinions as to the propriety of filing claims. Assume further that in
each case, after considering a negotiated solution, proper lawyering
decisions were made to consider only individual lawsuits on behalf
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of Smith and the Morris family members.6 A variety of questions
must be resolved in both cases before filing, including what substantive claims to assert, whom to sue, where to sue, and what
kinds of relief to seek. Even if the lawyers took the narrow view of
the clients' decisionmaking role, each would have to obtain, at a
minimum, informed consent to the filing of a lawsuit and general
approval of the relief being sought." If the lawyers took a broader
view of the client's role, they would discuss with the client such
issues as the selection of the court, selection of claims, selection of
defendants, and jury demands since these matters arguably are relevant to the "merits" of the claim (EC 7-7) and to the "objectives
of the representation" (Model Rule 1.2(a)). Even more importantly, if the two lawyers were adherents of client-centered decisionmaking, they would facilitate their clients' consideration of a
variety of non-legal factors. For example, in racial discrimination
cases different clients have different emotional reactions to the victimization. They also often have quite different psychological responses to the option of waging a lengthy lawsuit rather than settling quickly. Only the individual clients can evaluate the
importance of these factors and weigh them in the context of the
lawyer's legal opinions. Similarly, those injured from toxic torts,
like discrimination victims, may have strong altruistic needs to
prevent recurrence of the violations. A client-centered lawyer
would ensure that the client considered these issues before proceeding. 7 As indicated, even under the narrower view of the client's role, Greenblatt and Bradley, at a minimum, were required to
talk to their clients, explain the options, and obtain their consent
to the basic litigation decisions.
Several assumptions are implicit in the decisionmaking process just described. One is that a lawyer can transmit information
in a comprehensible way to a client and yet still remain neutral, or

65. Even if a client does not propose the possibility of a class action or even know of it
as a possibility, the lawyer still ought to consider it as an option, if only from the strictly
narrow perspective of what is the best way to assist that particular client. In these two cases,
for example, both Greenblatt and Bradley certainly should have considered the option of a
class action. See infra notes 80-93, 241-80 and accompanying text (regarding the manner in
which the lawyer ought to be resolving this threshold question).
66. See MODEL CODE EC 7-7, MODEL RULE Rule 1.2(a). For the principal texts of these
two rules, see supra notes 25, 33.
67. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 21-103 (skills that are required to
effectively complete such a client-centered interviewing and counseling session).
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at least non-manipulative, so that the client and not the lawyer
makes the decisions. As Professor Ellman recently wrote, avoiding
manipulation may be quite difficult. 8 He urges sensitivity in order
to avoid subtle undermining of client autonomy. 9 But, he also argues that it is entirely appropriate for a lawyer to give a candid
opinion to the client about how a client should proceed, since the
client should be considered competent enough to accept or reject
the lawyer's advice. Similarly, Professor Dinerstein suggests that
a lawyer can be properly respectful of a client's individual dignity,
and yet still aggressively ensure that a client considers all possible
courses of action, including alternatives to litigation, even if the
client had not yet considered them or had even rejected them.7 '
Professor Simon goes further still and argues that the lawyer ought
to inject her own view as to the course of action that would lead to
the most just results, even at the expense of a client's control.72 In
any event, in the Smith and Morris hypotheticals, we assume that
the lawyers can provide their clients with the information necessary to decide, without pre-determining the decisions.
Assuming then that attorneys Greenblatt and Bradley have
successfully walked the fine line between good client-centered

68. See Elman, supra note 11, at 733-39. Professor Ellman concludes, for example, that
even lawyering attempts to evince non-judgmental understanding can be manipulative. See
id. One commentator goes further: "[flt
is impossible so to organize my behavior that it is
not manipulative." Lehman, The Pursuit of a Client's Interest, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1078
(1978), excerpted in L. RISKIN & J. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 83 (unabridged ed. 1987).
69. See Ellman, supra note 11, at 733-39.
70. Id. The same thesis has been espoused with respect to further development of informed consent principles in the context of the patient-doctor relationship. Alan J. Weisbard has argued that rather than using either the traditional paternalistic model or what he
calls the "mirror image of that model "consumer sovereignty" which relegates the professional to the passive role of a "body mechanic" or "technician," he proposes that what is
needed is a collaborative shared decisionmaking process based on "mutual respect." Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L.
REV. 749-67 (1986). He even suggests that the term "informed consent" may not adequately
describe this process. I agree; it sounds much more like client-centered (i.e., patient-centered) decisionmaking.
71. See R. Dinerstein, supra note 11, at 11-13. A more extreme example of the possibility that manipulation can occur is in the case of the incompetent client such as a mentally
disabled individual or a child. Professor Tremblay discusses the extraordinary challenges
and difficulties of adhering to client-centered norms in these contexts. See generally Tremblay, supra note 11.
72. See Simon, supra note 15, at 1143-47; cf. MODEL CODE EC 7-13 (prosecuting attorney's exercise of discretion to prosecute or not prosecute a criminal action).
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lawyering and unacceptable manipulation, the hypotheticals also
assume that the lawyers have properly identified the possible clients and have effectively communicated with all of them.73 In the
case of Jack Smith, the discrimination victim, and continuing to
put aside for the moment class action considerations, that identification seems relatively straightforward, though even here the situation may be deceptive. For example, if Jack Smith were married,
or planned to share the apartment with a roommate, should that
person also be a client? Should the black tester be a client if he
wanted to sue?74 Should Greenblatt's organizational employer (or a
sister advocacy organization) be a plaintiff and therefore a client?75
Assuming individual client competency, Greenblatt certainly could
talk with Smith and any possible individual co-plaintiff. The question of including the organization raises slightly more difficult
though resolvable questions. Greenblatt would have to sensitively
interview Smith to see what his views and wishes were on the issue
of joining forces with co-plaintiffs. The potential conflicts between
these possible "clients" even in this relatively uncomplicated case
suggest the still greater problems in a class action context.
The backyard odors case raises similar problems of identification and communication. For example, Daniel Morris is the only
one of the Morris family members who has so far talked to Bradley. Must Bradley talk to each one? What if the family member
with early cancer is the eleven year old daughter? Should Bradley
talk to her, her father or mother on her behalf or seek appointment
of a guardian ad litem? What if there are or could be conflicts of
interest among the family members? One could posit even more
complicating facts. 76 But here, as in the Smith case, there are only

73. This often is a large assumption as the main text following this footnote suggests.
Neither the identity of the client nor the assurance of an effective way to communicate with
the client is always easily at hand. See G. HAZARD, supra note 10, at 45.
74. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coles, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (Supreme Court held that a
black tester had standing to sue for a violation of the anti-discrimination laws).
75. For example, in two recent significant civil rights cases the NAACP was a principal
plaintiff. See Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 928 (2d Cir.
1988); United States & NAACP v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1185 (2d Cir. 1987).
Even in simpler, basically individual claims, civil rights organizations often are co-plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Mealing v. Liu, 15 Fair Housing-Fair Lending (P-H) 538 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (coplaintiffs included the individual victim, the tester, and a civil rights organization).
76. For example, if the husband or wife were mentally incompetent a guardian might
have to be appointed. The potential conflicts become even greater between and among the
lawyer, the guardian and the incompetent. See Hazard, TriangularLawyer Relationships:
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a small number of persons whose consent is required. Bradley must
explain to the Morris parents and probably the eleven-year-old
cancer stricken daughter 77 the possible conflicts of interest between persons whose physical injury is actual compared to persons
whose injury has not yet become visible. Further, the lawyer must
explore, with some sensitivity, the emotional and psychological
consequences of the daughter waging a litigation battle separate
from her parents. A client-centered lawyer must encourage the
Morris family to weigh these non-legal factors, as only the directly
affected individuals may do.78 Ultimately, the family would decide
and Bradley could obtain meaningful consent, even formal consent,
as to how to proceed.79
Both the Smith and Morris cases illustrate that while complications about who to talk to and how to implement client-oriented
decisionmaking can arise even in the seemingly simple case, these
kinds of possible conflicts of interests usually can be resolved satisfactorily in accordance with the applicable ethics code provisions
and by effective application of client-centered lawyering skills.
Such conflicts need not be and usually are not an insuperable obstacle to good client-centered lawyering. Full disclosure, meaningful consent and skillful facilitation of active client participation are
viable tools to deal with cases such as these that involve multiple
clients.
2. Bringing Class Actions: The Decisionmaking Process
If the Smith and Morris claims are brought as class actions,
however, achieving the goals of informed consent and client-centered decisionmaking is a much more difficult undertaking. Let me
return to the Smith case and add some facts. Assume that in the
past five months Smith is the third person who has consulted
Greenblatt's office about alleged racial discrimination at the

An Exploratory Analysis, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1987).
77. See infra notes 218-31 and accompanying text (regarding the lawyer's obligation to
try and work with child clients to explain adequately the consequences of a course of action
and to obtain their consent).
78. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 147-53.
79. Under the applicable ethics code provisions, if the lawyer concludes that the interests of the clients can be harmonized, the clients may consent to joint representation after
full disclosure by the lawyer. See generally G. HAZARD & W.R. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 121-54 (1986).
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Queens complex. The first two did not choose to pursue their
claims for reasons unrelated to the strength of their claims; in one
of the two instances, Greenblatt's office conducted a successful test
and though a tester lawsuit was theoretically available, it was not
filed. These additional facts raise a question as to whom Greenblatt should consult in making the various pre-filing decisions. If
she wishes to consider a class action, should she talk only to Smith
or to the other possible claimants as well? Greenblatt certainly
would talk to Smith regarding the same issues noted above in an
individual client context, such as what relief Smith wants to seek.
Smith and Greenblatt might conclude that a class action is likely
to achieve the most successful results for Smith himself. On the
other hand, the greater complexity of a class suit might delay or
reduce relief for Smith.
To a large extent the resolution would depend on Smith's
objectives. If altruism were a major motivation (the elimination of
discrimination often is of great concern to civil rights victims),
Smith might favor a class action. This is exactly the kind of weighing process-assessing such non-legal factors-that a good clientcentered lawyer would encourage her client to pursue. More often,
however, the victim's motives are mixed, a desire for individual
reparation, as well as societal redress. If we assume further that
more testing and investigation of the housing complex suggest that
the discrimination is widespread, should Greenblatt present this
information to Smith and urge him or invite him to be a named
plaintiff in a class suit? The danger here is that even with the best
of motives, Greenblatt may be improperly influencing Smith to go
along with a decision that she has already made. 0
Certainly, the challenge to resist manipulating the client can
be extraordinary in the class context. Because so much more time

80. See, e.g., M. Hermann, Rhem v. Malcolm-A Case Study of Public Interest Litigation: Pretrial Detention (unpublished Masters Thesis, Harvard Law School) (May, 1977).
Professor Hermann analyzed the development and conduct of a major class action test case
which sought improvement of prison conditions. She concluded that class members played
no meaningful role in the litigation decisionmaking and indeed may have actually opposed
the lawsuit had they been made aware of a potential adverse consequence-namely, the
closing of the prison (the "Tombs") and the resultant severe problems of family visitation
with inmates. For a similar realistic view on the non-existent role of clients in a quite different category of class actions, see NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER CLASS AcTIONs-A PRACTICAL LITIGATION GUIDE (1987). As with other litigators' "how-to-do-it"
manuals, this guide proceeds on the implicit presumption that clients are but a perfunctory
though unavoidable necessary evil in filing and conducting class actions.
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and resources are needed for the class action, fee pressures alone
can transform the ostensible fiduciary into a selfish entrepeneur.
Moreover, the fundamental underlying rationale of client-centered
lawyering-that only the clients as the affected persons can weigh
the non-legal consequences of one outcome or another-has even
greater significance in the class context. If the class lawyer cannot
possibly talk to all of the class members, it becomes even more
critical that she talks to some, and that she obtains at least a sampling of client input on the important non-legal considerations.
Even the basic obligation to give information to the client can
overwhelm the class action lawyer. For example, assume Greenblatt identified a potential class of 250 black people who had applied for apartments unsuccessfully over the prior two year period.
Should she write to them before filing? If so, should she then meet
with each individually? To whom is she obligated to give the information? Should the communications be kept confidential? Should
she poll them on the various questions posed earlier-which defendants, which court, what are the goals of a lawsuit, what kind of
relief to seek?"' Moreover, if Greenblatt does take these information-gathering steps, unanimity is unlikely. What should she do in
the face of such differing positions? The existence of differences of
opinion among class members does not mean that the class action
should die. To the contrary, group action may still be the best
course of action for the class. It is in this situation, Professor Simon asserts, that the opinion of the class lawyer in favor of a class
action may be particularly appropriate.2 Neither the class action

81. See, e.g., Bergman, Class Action Lawyers: Fools for Clients, 4 AM. J.TRIAL ADVOC.
243 (1980). Professor Bergman concludes that the lawyers are the real clients in class actions
and voices concern that lawyers' decisionmaking will therefore inappropriately intrude on
the individual personal values of class members. He suggests that class members be organized to represent and then speak for the clients. While this analysis is thoughtful, his solution that class members organize themselves in order to present a unitary client view is, I
believe, unworkable. Cf.M. Hermann, supra note 80, at 71 (argument that the class lawyer
should train clients to know how to assume their responsibility as clients). The difficulty in
answering the questions in the text is not made easier even if the scenario did not include
the existence of two prior discrimination complaints. For even if there were only the single
Smith allegation, if Greenblatt had been able to discover that the 2500 unit complex was
ninety-nine white, that still would suggest a possible class action. Statistical inferences can
be probative of discrimination in housing. See, e.g., Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of
Huntington, 844 F.2d 962, 929 (2d Cir. 1988).
82. See Simon, supra note 14, at 480-81. Professor Coffee goes further and states that
"class clients are not entitled to their preference (i.e., financial or ameliorative relief) ...
and that [class] client objectives should not always control litigation decisions, even in the

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 40:709

law, which I will discuss shortly, nor the ethics codes assist Greenblatt. With respect to all of these questions, therefore, Greenblatt
must operate with no real lawyering guidance.
The situation is no simpler for Bradley in the toxic tort case.
Indeed, in some ways, it will be even more procedurally complex."3
The client-centered issues just noted in the discrimination case are
essentially the same and no more easily resolved in the tort case.
Assume, for example, that there were 500 homes affected in substantially the same way as the Morris' home. Should Bradley consider a class action? If some potential class members have consulted other attorneys, how is he to handle the lawyer turf battles
that may ensue?8 4 Even from a defensive perspective, Bradley
probably would be derelict in not assessing a class action as the
most effective vehicle for the Morris family.8 5 Who decides? Who
is the client? 6 Should Bradley talk to the owners of the other 499

settlement context." Coffee, Rethinking the Class Action: A Policy Primer on Reform, 62
IND. L.J. 625, 632 n.23 (1987).
83. In some mass tort cases, the extent of the injury suffered, and therefore, the
amount of damages sought by each class member victim will be much greater than is typically the case in a civil rights or consumer fraud case. See, e.g., In re Federal Skywalk Cases,
680 F.2d 1175, 1187 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1988 (1983). As a result, class
members may vigorously contest in every conceivable way, procedural or otherwise, any aggregation of claims which might diminish the value of any individual claim. In other mass
torts, causation problems can complicate resolution of the issue of whether a class action is
the optimal device, either from an individual perspective or a systemic judicial vantage
point. See, e.g., McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 93 F.R.D. 875 (D.C. Dak. 1982) (denial of
class certification in DES case where it is unclear which manufacturer produced the particular drug that induced injury); Rosenberg, Toxic Tort Litigation: Crises or Chrysalis? A
Comment On Feinberg's Conceptual Problems and Proposed Solutions, 24 Hous. L. REV.
183, 194-96 (1987) (in favor of toxic tort class actions).
84. For example, the comment of the late Irving Younger regarding the opposition of
local lawyers to his filing of a class action in the Kansas City "Skywalk" case serves as an
illustration: "[imn Kansas City, I'm still referred to as the anti-Christ." Martin, The Rise
and Fall of the Class Action Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7, col. 1.
85. Defensive evaluation is necessary in order to be prepared to contest another victim's use of the class action in the event, for example, that Bradley concluded that the
Morris family would be best served by individual and not class litigation. See, e.g., In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982) (extraordinarily intense litigation occurred among the lawyers fighting for or against class certification; see also Civil Litigation
in Mass Disasters: The Hyatt Skywalks Collapse, 52 UMKC L. REV. 141-338 (1984) (collected articles).
86. The question or problem of the identity of the client is not confined to the mass
tort or civil rights cases like the two hypotheticals discussed here. A lawyer may also, for
example, have difficulty in identifying: a) the corporate client in a takeover battle-the corporate entity, the board of directors of the target, the officers, the employees, or the shareholders of the target (see Karmel, Duty to the Target: Is an Attorney's Duty to the Corpo-
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homes? How should the communication take place? Most importantly, again assuming Bradley discerned the true views of the
class members, how is he to synthesize the information obtained
and then act on it? Even the ostensibly egalitarian suggestion that
class members elect a representative is not a panacea. As Professor
Hermann has persuasively written regarding a prison conditions
case, the elected representative often will be the most articulate,
frequently the most radical, but not necessarily the most representative of the views of class members.8 7 Conversely, if a class member takes a position that seems irrational, that does not mean it
ought to be accorded any less weight than it would be given in the
individual client context. For example, a cancer victim of the toxic
tort might wish to seek maximum punitive damages, literally as
revenge.8 8
Class action lawyers struggle with these difficult questions everyday. The ethical rules governing conflicts of interest in representing multiple clients do not meaningfully assist the class action
attorney.89 Even the Model Rules only hint at how the client-centered rules may be applied in the class action context. Model Rule
1.13 governs the "Organization as Client." While this rule most obviously is intended to encompass the attorney's relationship with a

rationa Paradigmfor Directors?,39 HASTINGS L.J. 677 (1988)); or b) a child or incompetent.
See infra notes 218-40 and accompanying text.
87. See M. Hermann, supra note 80, at 55-56.
88. See Barrett, For Many Dalkon Shields Claimants Settlements Won't End the
Trauma, Wall St. J., Apr. 12, 1988, at 42, col. 4. In questioning the adequacy of the settlement procedures, various class member victims were quoted: "I lost most of my adult life
and I won't go quietly," "I'd like to get Robins officials across the table and get them to
apologize to me. That would be worth millions," and "I want revenge, people thrown in jail,
huge money awards, public punishment. The quiet efficient bureaucracy of the [settlement]
doesn't satisfy me." Id.; see also Blum, Class Action Filed in Flight 811 Case, Nat'l L.J.,
May 1, 1989, at 3. (A lawyer for one of the accident victims and a member of the putative
class said: "[my client does not want [to sue] ....

People have a right not to sue." In

response, the class lawyer said there are "different motivations for law practice."); Glaberson, Determined to Be Heard, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 2, 1988, at 32 (profiles of four persons
whose cases were argued in the Supreme Court; focuses on the highly individualistic reasons
why these persons would spend five to ten years waging a legal battle; e.g., altruism, selfpunishment, obsessiveness, justice, self-improvement, frustration, etc.).
89. See G. HAZARD & W.R. HODES, supra note 79, at 57-62. As with other ethical provisions, the rules relating to multiple representation and conflicts of interest seem to envision
two or more individual clients or organizations and not a class of individuals. See MODEL
CODE DR 5-105, EC 5-14 to -20; see also MODEL RULES 1.7, 1.9. See generally Note, Developments In the Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1244,
1446-58 (1981).
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corporation or other similar legal entities, two commentators assert
that it "may also apply to informal groups who have come together
only for the purpose of seeking legal representation." ' But even if
that is a reasonable interpretation, it does not address the issue of
who will work with the class lawyer in making the decisions for the
class. Model Rule 1.13, like all other Model Rules and Code provisions, does not mention class actions. Thus, the class lawyer is left
with no direction as to how to implement client control even if she
wanted to do so.
Further, as Professor Wolfram writes in his excellent ethics
treatise, requiring client autonomy could deny "the possibility of
public interest representation." ' Recognizing the importance of
class actions, he suggests that the class lawyers should be permitted "to make critical decisions themselves ... by honestly consult92
ing their own best conception of what public interest dictates.
Should this solution be adopted or should we perpetuate the myth
that clients control class actions?93 I prefer the former choice.
III.

CLASS ACTIONS

Before suggesting ways to implement the principles of informed consent and client-centered decisionmaking in class actions, I must review briefly the doctrinal basis for class actions and
discuss the specific provisions of Civil Procedure Rule 23 that
might be used to facilitate the accomplishment of these goals. Rule
23 does not explicitly address these concerns and the courts thus
far have refrained from using the existing provisions of the rule to
ensure effective participation by class members.
A.

Doctrinal Rationale

Class actions enable the judiciary to adjudicate multiple

90. G. HAZARD & W.R. HODES, supra note 79, at 241.
91. C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 940 (1986). But for at least one commentator
that may be an appropriate resolution of the issues under consideration here. See Breger,
Accountability and the Adjudication of the Public Interest, 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 349
(1987).
92. C. WOLFRAM, supra note 91, at 941.
93. See Wolfram, The Second Set of Players:Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the Limits of
ProfessionalDiscipline, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293, 295 (1984); see also Rhode, supra
note 6, at 1262 (Professor Rhode uses the word "fiction" to describe the rules governing the
role of clients in class adjudication).
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claims that are identical or similar in the most efficient way possible. It is a procedural vehicle which allows hundreds or thousands
of people to litigate the same claim in a single action rather than in
individual lawsuits." Moreover, class actions permit the small consumer or other under-represented persons to obtain relief that
might otherwise be unobtainable.9 5
Two fundamental procedural norms are integral to the fair
and effective use of class actions. With certain exceptions, principles of claim and issue preclusion make the judgment in a properly
certified class action binding on all members of the class and the
opposing party.9 6 Thus, if the defendant wins, a member of the
plaintiff class ordinarily will not be permitted to bring a subsequent individual action that raises claims identical to those adjudicated in the class action. 7 Due process, in turn, requires that the
class members be given their figurative, if not literal, day in court
if they are to be bound. Due process is satisfied only if the representative parties (and their attorneys) "adequately" represent the
interests of the members of the plaintiff class.98
With this cursory review in mind, do the procedural rules give
the class "client" a decisionmaking role comparable to an individual client? Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor comparable state procedural rules contain class action provisions explicitly defining the respective decisionmaking roles of
representative plaintiffs, class members, or class counsel. For that
matter, the procedural rules also do not deal with this issue in the

94. See generally H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, § 1.01; see, e.g., Stots v. Media Real Estate, 355 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (one of nine cases contesting constitutionally of
Landlord-Tenant Act).
95. See Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device of Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. IND. &
COM. L. REV. 501 (1969).

96. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL

PROCEDURE

756 (1985). The major

qualification is the (b)(3) class action which permits class members to opt out, thereby
avoiding any preclusion effects.
97. Preclusion does require that there be an identity of claims. See, e.g., General Tel v.
Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); see also C.A. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FED. PROC. &
PROCEDURE 273-74 (2d ed. 1986).
98. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 808 (1985); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940). The Supreme Court has never clearly resolved whether procedural due process requires notice to members of the class. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974), the Court ambiguously relied on a due process decision, Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust, 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (reasonable efforts to effect notice are
required), in support of its interpretation of the Rule 23 requirement that notice is required
at least in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. See Eisen, 417 U.S. at 173-75.
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context of individual actions. Only ethics codes expressly address
the respect for and autonomy of clients, and for the most part, as
previously discussed,9 9 the codes only address representation of the
individual client.
B. ProceduralRules Relating to Client Decisionmaking in
Class Actions
While there are several provisions of Civil Procedure Rule 23
that at least implicitly deal with the respective roles of representative plaintiffs and unnamed class members, 10 courts rarely discuss
what decisionmaking responsibilities should be exercised by class
clients. 0 1 Justice Stevens has written that even the status of the
10 2
absent members "has always been difficult to define accurately."'
Typically, courts discuss the role of class members if an open conflict erupts among class members or between one or more class
members and a named plaintiff or class counsel. 10 3 If a conflict is
not apparent or is not raised by a class member or a third party
either at the time a class is certified or at the time a class settlement is approved, the issue of what role clients played in decisionmaking ordinarily is not addressed by the courts. In that sense

99. See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
100. See FED. R CIV. P. (23)(a)(4) (adequacy of representation); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2),
(3) (judicial authority to order certain steps to be taken to protect the interests of parties);
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (requirement of judicial approval of all class settlements).
101. A noted exception is Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979) (discussed extensively infra notes 140-57 and
accompanying text).
102. Deposit Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 343 n.3, reh'g denied, 446
U.S. 947 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court, in Roper, held that defendants' tender
of maximum recovery to named plaintiffs cannot moot class claim insofar as the named
plaintiffs' right to appeal a denial of class certification. Other courts have referred to absent
class members as "passive parties" (pre-class certification), see American Pipe & Constr. Co.
v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), and "derivative parties", see In re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litig., 552 F.2d 1088, 1105 (5th Cir. 1977); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975). In
dissenting to the Sosna holding that a named plaintiff, whose claim became moot after class
certification, can still prosecute a class action, Justice White concluded: "[iln reality, there
is no longer a named plaintiff in the class, no member of the class before the court. The
unresolved issue, the attorney, and a class of unnamed litigants remain. None of the anonymous members of the class is present to direct counsel and ensure that class interests are
being properly served." Sosna, 419 U.S. at 412.
103. See, e.g., Shimkus v. Gersten, 816 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1987) (directing the lower
court to permit competing minority groups to intervene as sub-classes to resolve how a limited affirmative action pie would be divided up).
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04
class actions are the same as individual actions.

1. Rule 23(a)(4)
a. Conflicts of Interest
Rule 23(a)(4), which requires that the class representatives
"adequately and fairly" represent the class, 10 5 has been the principal vehicle for judicial resolution of open conflicts of interest between clients or conflicts between lawyer and clients. 10 6 It is also
used, although much less frequently, to examine the decisionmaking role of the client, or at least the representative plaintiff, in the
conduct of class actions. 10 7 Under Rule 23(a)(4), courts have considered the extent to which named plaintiffs actually must be involved in the conduct of the class action and be familiar with the
underlying factual circumstances supporting the class claim.'0 8
The paradigm Rule 23(a)(4) conflict of interest case is
presented when the explicitly stated interests of the class lawyer or
the named plaintiffs are antagonistic to those of other class members. 09 These open conflicts might be tactical," 0 practical,"' or

104. Other than in articles or texts on lawyering skills (see, e.g., D. BINDER & S. PRICE,
.supra note 11, at 147-53), the allegation that a lawyer violated the strictures of client-centered decisionmaking or more narrowly, the informed consent requirements, or even the
discussion of this principle, ordinarily will arise only in a disciplinary proceeding or a legal
malpractice case when a client makes the assertion. See, e.g., Spiegel, supra note 11, at 6772; see also R. COVER, O. Fiss & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE 784-88 (1988).
105. Rule 23(a) reads as follows:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the class and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
106. See, e.g., Piambino v. Bailey 757 F.2d 1112, 1119 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1169 (1986); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1011 (1975).
107. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978); see
also infra notes 140-57 and accompanying text (extended discussion of Pettway).
108. Compare In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1974)
(named plaintiffs required to have first-hand knowledge of underlying facts to satisfy "adequacy" requirement) with Piel v. National Semi Conductor Co., 86 F.R.D. 357, 366 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (named plaintiff need not be familiar because court has oversight responsibility to
ensure adequate protection of class members), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 903 (1985).
109. See, e.g., Wetzel, 508 F.2d at 247. See generally H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, §§
3.22-25, 3.16; Note, supra note 89, at 1447.
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sometimes ideological or political." 2 One commentator suggests
that there is an inherent conflict between clients and a lawyer in
class actions because the lawyer is more an entrepreneur than a
fiduciary." 3 In some cases, there may be only an appearance of a

conflict, such as when class counsel has a close or familial relationship with a named plaintiff." 4 Typically, in the case law, the conflict either is apparent on the face of the litigation (such as when
the class lawyer is closely related to a class representative, or indeed is one and the same)" 5 or is brought to the court's attention

110. See, e.g., Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, Inc., 684 F.2d 324, 331 (5th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 480 U.S. 931 (1987). In this antitrust class action challenging an airport's restrictions on taxicabs, two factions of the plaintiff class were at loggerheads with respect to
nearly all aspects of the conduct of the litigation. As a result, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that in all probability the representatives of neither faction could adequately represent the
other.
111. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ryan Stevedoring Co., 521 F.2d 551, 553 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977). Class certification denied when most members of a Black
union opposed a Black union member class in an action seeking integration with a white
union. The opponents of class certification, in essence, felt the status quo employment arrangements were better than what they would get in a consolidated union.
112. In school desegregation cases there may be disputes, for example, between those
seeking to improve segregated Black schools and those seeking busing to desegregate. See,
e.g., Armstrong v. City of Milwaukee, 616 F.2d 305, 323 (7th Cir. 1980); cf. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 448-70 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (plaintiff's lawyer has a conflict
between fiduciary obligation to his client(s) and ideological duty to his employer, the
NAACP). See generally Bell, Serving Two Masters: IntegrationIdeals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
113. See Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 726 (1986). Professor Coffee argues that the plaintiffs' attorney in class
actions is quite different from the agent-lawyer in the individual client relationship and
should be so recognized. Id. at 683-84. To minimize the lawyer-client conflict, he urges a
restructuring of fee arrangements so that the class lawyer's entrepreneurial interests parallel
the class interests in a more mutually reinforcing manner. Were this the case, he goes further and suggests that: "an economic answer might be to eliminate the plaintiff-attorney
relationship entirely by permitting the plaintiffs' attorney to acquire all the clients' rights in
the action." Id. at 691; see also Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensation, Deterrence
and Conflict of Interest, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 47 (1975); Garth, Nagel and Player, The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 353, 391-94 (1988). Authors acknowledge Coffee's thesis
about the desirability of better fee incentives to lessen conflicts between lawyer and clients,
but ultimately, are not overly optimistic that his reforms are achievable in context of present class action structures.
114. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1186 (delineating a taxonomy of intra-class conflicts).
A familial relationship between named plaintiff and counsel sometimes is allowed as long as
the court is persuaded that the lawyer is not more interested in a fee to the detriment of the
class. See, e.g., Malchman v. Davis, 706 F.2d 426, 432 (2d Cir. 1983).
115. See, e.g., Zylstra v. Safeway Stores Inc., 578 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1978). See
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apparent nor
by a dissident class member. If a conflict is 11neither
6
raised by a class member, it is not explored.
But even as to the open and notorious intra-class conflicts,
Rule 23 and existing legal doctrine, to use Professor Rhode's apt
language, is "singularly laconic;" and offers "little guidance to
courts and counsel who confront intra-class schisms." 1 7 In the last
part of this Article, I address the need to establish clearer rules for
all class actions. My concern is that whether conflicts are open or
not, the class lawyer must facilitate active client participation, and
yet assume the ultimate decisionmaking responsibility.
b. Adequacy of Named Plaintiff
The Rule 23(a)(4) requirement that the named plaintiff be an
adequate representative of the class also is relevant to client-centered decisionmaking. Some courts demand greater involvement by
named plaintiffs than by unnamed class members." 8 Thus, class
certification has been denied when the named plaintiffs apparently
did not have knowledge, interest, or experience in the matters being litigated." 9 Other courts insist only that representative plaintiffs be alert and basically aware of what is going on in the litigation.' 20 A sophisticated understanding by the named plaintiff of
the underlying subject matter is not necessary.'' Thus, most
courts have recognized that if they demand too much of the named

generally Note, Class Action Counsel as Named Plaintiff: Double Trouble, 56 FORD.L. REV.
111 (1987).

116. This raises one of the questions in this Article-namely, whether the class attorney has a client-centered lawyering obligation to affirmatively seek out the views of the class

"clients." I conclude that the class lawyer does have such a duty. See infra notes 241-58 and

accompanying text.
117. Rhode, supra note 6, at 1191.
118. See Piel v. National Semi Conductor Co., 86 F.R.D. 357, 366 (E.D. Pa. 1980); In re

Goldchip Funding, 61 F.R.D. 592, 594-95 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
119. See, e.g., Greenspan v. Brassler 78 F.R.D. 130, 133-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Goldchip

Funding, 61 F.R.D. at 592.
120. See, e.g., Michael v. Ambassador Group, 110 F.R.D. 84, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re

New York City Mun. Sec. Litig., 87 F.R.D. 572, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); cf. Kirkpatrick v. J.C.
Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 728 (11th Cir. 1987) (class certification should be denied
when named plaintiff is nothing more than a mere figurehead), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1220

(1988).
121. See Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373, reh'g denied, 384 U.S. 915
(1966). Lack of comprehension of the business transaction is not a bar to satisfy adequate
representation requirement. Rules of procedure must be applied "as nearly as possible [to]
guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits." Id.
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plaintiff, redress of multiple wrongdoing cannot be achieved. 122
These cases reflect tensions in Rule 23 about the role named plaintiffs and absent class members should play in class actions. If these
decisions are based on the illusory premise that class members in
fact play meaningful decisionmaking roles, they perpetuate a myth
about client involvement. 2 3 If they seek to cast the named plaintiff
in the useful role of information source 12 4 or as a watchdog to spur
the class lawyer, 25 these decisions offer constructive guidance to
class lawyers. Courts might also, as I suggest below, 2 rely on the
named plaintiff as a representative class member whose feelings
and views on non-legal considerations are effectively integrated
into the class lawyer's decisionmaking.
One decision imposed particularly demanding requirements on
the named plaintiffs because of the court's concern that "naive
plaintiffs" would be taken advantage of or exploited by aggressive
entrepeneurial lawyers. 2 7 This is, of course, a legitimate concern in
any client-lawyer relationship, as discussed above. But the solution
is not to eviscerate class actions by establishing requirements that
are too stringent to satisfy. 28 Instead, courts should foster more
129
skillful and effective lawyer-client communication.
2. Rule 23(e)
Rule 23(e), which concerns termination of class actions, ostensibly seeks to satisfy the principle of informed consent. Unfortunately, however, it is rarely applied to achieve this goal. Rule 23(e)
explicitly requires the court to approve any settlement or dismissal
of a class action, but it only requires notice to class members in

122. See id.; see also Piel, 86 F.R.D. at 107.
123. See Kirkpatrick, 827 F.2d at 728.
124. See Goldchip Funding, 61 F.R.D. at 594 (representative plaintiff can "offer personal knowledge of the factual circumstances").
125. See Municipal Sec. Litig., 87 F.R.D. at 579 (named plaintiff can help to ensure
"vigorous prosecution of the claims").
126. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text.
127. See Goldchip Funding, 61 F.R.D. at 594; see also supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., the accountability requirements proposed by one author. Breger, supra
note 91.
129. See Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89 (1981) (Supreme Court began the effort of
facilitating communication by eliminating unreasonable barriers to communication between
class lawyer and class members); see also infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
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"such manner as the court directs.'

130

When courts use that discre-

tion to ensure that all class members receive actual notice, the
class clients at least have an opportunity to voice public objections
if they wish to do so.' 3 ' For a variety of reasons, not the least of
which is the frequently incomprehensible form of the notice, 13 2 the
right to object is rarely exercised. Instead, class members passively
consent, acquiesce or cynically disregard the notice-the choice of
characterization depending on one's perspective and attitude. Class
lawyers are even less inclined to reach out to the class members at
settlement than at earlier stages in the litigation. At the settlement
point, the class lawyer already has invested her energy and skills in
reaching a compromise, so there is a natural hesitancy to ferret out
critics.' 3 3 Neither the ethical nor the procedural rules require the

class lawyer to do more than satisfy the Rule 23(e) notice directive.
As a result, most class settlements get approved with little objection and generally little judicial involvement. 3 4 If class mem-

130. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e): "notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs" with FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(c)(2) for notice in all Rule 23(b)(3) class actions: "the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(e), 23(c)(2); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974).
131. Typically, however, prior to the point when notice is given to class members, counsel for both sides will have expended much time and energy in reaching a mutually acceptable compromise, and the court often will have played some kind of a supportive, if not
mediating, role in the efforts to produce a settlement. Thus, at the time when the vast
majority of class members are first invited into the decisionmaking process relating to settlement, the other critical parties (i.e. the class lawyers, defense lawyer, most probably the
defendant and perhaps the court) have invested substantial energy and resources in the
propriety of the settlement and there already is an extraordinary momentum in support of
the proposed decree.
132. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1234-42. The author offers two examples of responses
to a class notice in an antitrust damages case on behalf of antibiotic purchasers (giving class
members a chance to opt out) to illustrate the point:
Dear Sir: I received your pamphlet on drugs which I think will be of great value
to me in the future. Due to circumstances beyond my control, I will not be able to
attend this class at the time prescribed on your letter due to the fact that my working hours are from 7:00 until 4:30.
Dear Sir: Our son is in the Navy, stationed in the Carribean some place. Please
let us know exactly what kind of drugs he is accused of taking. From a mother who
will help if properly informed. A worried mother.
See also Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313 (1973)
133. See supra note 131; Rhode, supra note 6, at 1205-12 (referring in particular to
views expressed by various class action lawyers in interviews with Professor Rhode).
134. In terms of the substantive terms of the settlement, many courts in applying a
loose standard of what is "fair, reasonable and adequate under the circumstances" essen-
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bers do voice objections, some courts assume an active monitoring
role while others rely on counsel to resolve the conflicts.'3 5 In my
view, conflicts can best be resolved, if not prevented, by affirmatively soliciting the views of class clients (in some viable
way-perhaps randomly) early in the litigation and encouraging
them to participate in the formulation and then the approval of a
the
settlement. 136 Ultimately, as the advocate-trustee for the class,
37
court.1
the
to
plan
settlement
the
present
must
class lawyer
The court's role at settlement must also be assessed. Just how
involved should a court be in a settlement process? 38 Typically,
judicial discussions of settlement disputes focus on the resolution
of open conflicts and do not address the process of representation
of decisionmaking responsibilities between
or the proper division
39
client and lawyer.1

tially defer to whatever the lawyers have negotiated. See Patterson v. Stovall 528 F.2d 108,
114 (7th Cir. 1976); C. WRIGHT, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.44 (2d ed. 1985).
Rarely do settlements terms get modified. "It is thus the unusual case where the objections
of absent class members result in a changed settlement." Ricciuti, supra note 18, at 833.
This hands off attitude has been severely criticized by Professor Owen Fiss. Professor Fiss
believes that a class action consent decree "transform[s] the social function of adjudication
from interpreting and actualizing public values into one of maximizing the satisfaction of
the preference of the parties. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CH. LEGAL F. 1, 9 (1987).
Then, he asserts, the court ceases to perform its necessary "legitimating" function and becomes instead, simply an "instrumental" functionary of the parties. Id. at 14.
135. For example, courts generally do not interpret Rule 23(e) to require a trial or even
an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir.
1974). Rather, pursuant to the Manual for Complex Litigation, the court simply "must be
provided with adequate information.., to assume [inter alia] that there is no collusion." Id.
§ 23.14. There is a "presumption of correctness . . . to a class settlement reached in arms
length negotiations ..... " Id. § 30.41. "Counsel for the parties are the main source of information concerning the settlement." Id. § 30.42.
136. It appears to me that one justification for client-centered lawyering-namely, that
client participation in the decisionmaking will produce greater ultimate client acceptance
and satisfaction than if there is no such participation-is equally applicable to class actions.
Cf. D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 147-53. Accordingly, if class members first learn
of a settlement at the last stages of a fairness hearing, the likelihood of conflict is great. If
they get involved earlier, conflicts may be diminished.
137. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1253-57 (suggestions as to how to resolve conflicts
when they surface at the point when a court evaluates a proposed settlement).
138. There has been considerable criticism of the role performed by the courts in approving Rule 23(e) settlements. See generally Fiss, supra note 134; Resnik, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 50-63. Though less categorical than Fiss, Professor Resnik is
critical of courts playing a negotiating as well as an approving role regarding consent decrees. The approval, Resnick asserts, is a judicial act but not a judicial judgment and there
are few guidelines for courts to follow in carrying out this act.
139. Rule 23(e) "protects the parties only against the most egregious and blatant
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The Pettway v. American Case Iron Pipe Co.' 0° decision is
one of the few that explicitly discusses the decisionmaking roles of
the class attorney, the representative plaintiffs, and the class members.""1 Pettway involved open and clear conflicts between class
members and between class members and counsel. Plaintiffs were
current and former Black employees of American Cast Iron Pipe
Company (ACIPCO), and they alleged that they were victims of
racial discrimination in employment. The action was certified as a
(b)(2) class action, and after some preliminary skirmishes, the trial
court found that certain of the ACIPCO practices had an adverse
racial impact on plaintiffs and violated the applicable law.'42 From
that point in 1971, however, until issuance of a sixty-six page opinion by the Fifth Circuit in 1978,''1 there were intense and protracted disputes about what relief should be granted. There were
three basic areas of conflict: 1) what injunctive relief was necessary
to correct the effects of the prior wrongs and prevent any recurrence; 2) whom among the class were entitled to back pay awards,
and 3) what was the appropriate amount of the back pay award.'
Well before the 1978 opinion but after a third reversal and
remand by the Fifth Circuit, 1 45 the trial court encouraged settle-

ment discussions and actively participated in the negotiations.'46

abuses." Kane, supra note 8, at 403. Professor Kane urges a more active cooperative effort
on the part of the court and the class attorney in ensuring that settlements protect the
interests of class members. Id. Some courts assume a more involved role than others in
assessing the adequacy of settlements. Compare Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 69
(2d Cir. 1982) (court is guardian of class members), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983), with
Patterson v. Stovall, 528 F.2d 108, 114 (7th Cir. 1976) (deference to counsel's negotiated
agreement).
140. 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978).
141. Two key factors, however, limit the precedential impact of Pettway. See Pettway,
576 F.2d at 1157-1223. First, the organizational skills of the members of the plaintiff class
(242 employees or former employees) were extremely unusual. Second, the particular procedural and substantive facts in the cases were complex and unique. The issues the Pettway
court grappled with in 1978 remain essentially unresolved in 1989.
142. Id. at 1166; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
143. See Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1157-1223.
144. Id.
145. See Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
146. As Professor Resnik suggests, however, when a "sophisticated trial judge" carefully
times his views on the propriety of a proposed settlement, the resulting decree becomes
more like a coercive judicial "judgment," and the court's role more like the decisionmaker
than a mediator. See Resnik, supra note 138, at 61. Integration of the "client(s)" into this
decisionmaking process regarding class settlements, makes the process even more
complicated.
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The parties reached a partial agreement and a final order was entered by the trial court on November 20, 1975, ordering certain
injunctive relief and awarding aggregate back pay of $1 million to a
sub-class of 841 people. 4 7 During the extensive discussions among
the parties, counsel, and the court that preceded the entry of the
judgment, seventy percent of the 2200 class members made their
objections to the settlement terms known to the court.14 8 The objectors included five of the nine named plaintiffs and a very well
organized elected committee of all of the Black ACIPCO employees. To further complicate the situation, the class lawyer informed
both the class and the court that he would not appeal the November 20th judgment because he thought it was fair. Despite the objections, the judgment was entered and then appealed to the Fifth
Circuit.
The court of appeals addressed several issues, including 1)
whether dissatisfied class members could appeal the judgment, and
2) who was the appropriate decisionmaker for the class. As a preliminary matter the court concluded, that although the trial court's
decision was denominated a "judgment," it was in fact part consent decree and part judgment. 49 As to the judgment, the Fifth
Circuit held that it was not adequately supported by findings of
fact and conclusions of law.' 50 As to the settlement, the Court held
that the trial judge failed to satisfy the Rule 23(e) procedural requirements regarding notice to class members of a proposed
settlement.' 5'
The Fifth Circuit observed that it was an issue of first impression whether the objectors (even if they constituted a majority of
the class) could appeal the judgment despite the refusal of class
counsel to do so. 152 With refreshing candor, Judge Goldberg noted

147. See Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1166-67, 1214 n.70.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1168. The court itself described its role with respect to reviewing the action
of the trial court as "entering the twilight zone." Id. at 1168. See generally Fiss, supra note
134, at 41.
150. See Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1169.
151. Id. at 1214.
152. Id. at 1177. "we are not aware of any cases in which the named class representatives and a large position of the class desired to prosecute an appeal of a district court's
judgment, yet the class attorney refused to do so." Id. at 1176. The Fifth Circuit, however,
had previously held that class members who objected to a settlement did have standing to
appeal the approval of the settlement. See Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir.
1977).
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that the ethics code "remains unclear" as to whether provisions
giving individual clients the right to make "major litigation decisions" apply to class actions.153 He considered the possible decisionmakers-the class lawyer, the named plaintiffs and the class
members. The court concluded that previously active named plaintiffs who objected to the judgment could properly appeal, and that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow a substitution of counsel which would have permitted the objectors to
54
appeal.1
The court appropriately placed substantial reliance on the fact
that the plaintiff class was highly organized, and that the class
members' elected committee representatives also vigorously objected to the trial court's judgment.15 The court, noting that the
sentiment of the class as a whole is only one factor in resolving the
appealability question, also considered the fact that most of the
representative plaintiffs opposed the judgment. Despite the court's
recognition of the abilities and sincerity of class counsel, it concluded that the plaintiffs' "choice [to appeal] should have been
honored" by counsel.

56

The court in Pettway rested its principal decision on two relatively non-controversial principles of class action jurisprudence: 1)
the Rule 23(e) requirement that class members receive notice of a
settlement, and 2) the principle that the vociferous objections of
class members should be given great weight. 157 The court did not
indicate how to resolve the decisionmaking issue if there is proper
notice to a class and if there is a much less active or even totally
passive class. Indeed, the Pettway opinion implicitly suggests that
the class lawyer's decisions are presumptively correct in the absence of either open conflicts of interest or vociferous objection
from class members. But as this Article suggests, the silence of
class members does not necessarily mean that class members agree

153. Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1176.
154. Id. at 1180.
155. Cf. Bergman, supra note 81, at 43. Professor Bergman suggests that the class lawyer help organize the class. Pettway, however, clearly demonstrates that even when a class is
organized, it does not mean that decisionmaking will be simple or that conflicts will be
avoided. See Pettway, 576 F.2d at 1157.
156. Id. at 1180.
157. Id. at 1178. But, the fact that a majority of the class or even the majority of the
named plaintiffs oppose a settlement does not mean the settlement should be disapproved.
See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1982).
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with the lawyers' decision.
Pettway demonstrates the difficulties caused by the absence of
any decisionmaking guidelines for class actions; not only was the
plaintiffs' lawyer presumably at a loss as to how to negotiate and
consumate a settlement, but the trial court was similarly left to
flounder. While it is unlikely that the Pettway conflicts could have
been avoided, it is also clear that the problems were greatly exacerbated by the lack of any applicable ethical or procedural rules. The
frankness of the Fifth Circuit highlights this point. Unfortunately,
with the exception of the limited precedential guidance of Pettway, little else has changed which would make it any easier today
for the parties, counsel or the courts to handle a repetition of the
Pettway case.
As Professors Fiss and Resnik point out, class action settlements, at least those embodied in consent decrees, involve critical
systemic considerations beyond the questions of what role the class
client does or should play in effecting class settlements. 15 8 Because
of the public interest, the court must assume its obligation to oversee the propriety of terminating a class action. The parties should
not be able to construct and impose a settlement that the court
must enforce. 159 If the settlement does not result in a consent decree necessitating the continuing involvement of the court, the situation is different;6 0 while the court still has a Rule 23(e) approval
role, it is less significant, and the settlement is much more likely to
affect only private interests.""' In either case, the variable of the
courts' role must be integrated into the decisionmaking equation.
While the values underlying client-centered decisionmaking must
be respected at the class action settlement stage, it is clear that the
concerns for individual dignity and autonomy and the importance
of the client's evaluation of non-legal factors do not now play, nor

158. See supra notes 134, 138.
159. Cf. Simon, supra note 15, at 4. Like Owen Fiss, Professor Simon views the litigation process, and even the lawyering process generally, as encompassing broader concerns
than simply those reflective of a desire to expeditiously effectuate client wishes. For Simon,
the lawyer is an integral participant in our system of justice and must exercise discretion in
a way to maximize the pursuit of justice, even if, (he implicitly suggests) that occasionally
necessitates taking actions contrary to the wishes of the client.
160. The consent decree is "something more than a voluntary contract... li]t represents an exercise in public power that has not been preceded by the processes that serve as
the source of the legitimacy and authority of that power." Fiss, supra note 134, at 17.
161. Cf. Easterbook, Justice and Contractin Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHIC. LEGAL
F. 19, 30-31.
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should they play in class actions, the paramount role they do in
1 62
individual cases.
3. Rules 23(d)(2) and (3)
These two class action provisions, Rules 23(d)(2) and (3), give
courts discretionary authority to act to protect the interests of
class members. 6 ' As with other existing rules, Rules 23(d)(2) and
(3) do not deal explicitly with the respective decisionmaking responsibilities of a class lawyer, named plaintiff and class members.16 4 Rather, these open-ended provisions allow judges to respond to complaints or conflicts brought to their attention, and to
ameliorate some of the harsher consequences of Rule 23. For example, (b)(2) class actions do not require pre-certification notice, nor
are members of a (b)(2) class ordinarily permitted to opt out.'65

162. If the individual consent of each class member were required, disapproval of class
settlements would occur when even a single class member objected. As Professor Resnik
writes: "such a rule would simplify the inquiry and would locate it squarely on the question
of consent. However, the utility of class action litigation might be greatly diminished." Resnik, supra note 138, at 91, 172. Indeed, it is that recognition of the tension between clientcentered norms and class actions which underlies this Article.
163. See FEr,. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
Orders in Conduct of Actions: In the conduct of actions to which this applies, the
court may make appropriate orders: ... (2) requiring, for the protection of the class
or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner
as the court may direct to some or all of the members of any steps in the action, or
of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify
whether the, consider the representationfair and adequate, to intervene to present claims or defenses or otherwise come into the action; (3) imposing conditions
on the representative parties or on intervenors.
Id. (emphasis added)
164. Id.
165. The Rule 23 framework is paradoxical in that the rule requires notice to class
members and an opportunity to opt out of Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, whereas no such
notice is required nor is a chance to opt out afforded to class members in Rule 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2) class actions. Thus, in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, assuming there is actual notice,
there is consent of sorts (either tacit or explicit) of all class members. A Rule 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2) class action does not require even this limited form of consent. These latter two types
of class actions may proceed when the interests of the class appear to be congruent, "[slo
long as the [the class counsel's] articulation of that [common] interest does not strike the
court as entirely bizarre." Yeazell, supra note 7, at 1201. Professor Rhode usefully notes
that even when adhering to the Edmund Burke concept of the class lawyer as the enlightened trustee of the class (as opposed to the instructed delegate) it is important to the efficacy of this system of representation, that there be "some measure of consent." Rhode,
supra note 6, at 1. She cites J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust:A Theory of Judicial Review, in support of her proposition that a participatory foundation is especially important in
class actions when self-appointed class lawyers assume legislative and administrative type
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Nevertheless, pursuant to their (d)(2) discretion, courts have allowed class members to opt out of (b)(2) class actions."' 8 Conversely, judges have allowed class members to intervene under
(d) (2).67 Although intervention generally is not necessary in certified class actions for a class member to benefit from a judgment, ' 8
nor required to avoid statute of limitations problems,16 9 it can be
70
ordered if the court concludes it would be helpful to the court,1
or necessary to protect the rights of absent class members. But intervention under (d)(2) is not an automatic right and Rule 24(a)
intervention as of right requires a finding of inadequate represen-

responsibilities. Rhode, supra note 6, at 1201. Yet the common interest of a class may be
much more easily articulated by a class lawyer, for example, in a (b)(3) consumer overcharge
class action (e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)) than in a Rule 23(b)(2)
school desegregation class action where the interests and wishes of class members are more
complex and may differ significantly. In the latter class action, however, even the tacit consent of the class members is not required. See Yeazell, supra note 7, at 1201. Professor
Yeazell aptly describes this Rule 23 reality as "ideological schizophrenia." Id.
For purposes of this Article, however, Professor Yeazell's analysis does not go quite far
enough. While the class action rules seem to afford certain class members (namely, those in
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action) more rights than other class members (in a Rule 23(b)(1) or
(b)(2)), the notice-consent requirement in many Rule 23(b)(3) actions is for all practical
purposes, a meaningless one. Certainly, in terms of the give and take process of obtaining
informed consent from an individual client (or even more obviously, obtaining effective client participation) compliance with Rule 23(b)(3) notice requirements rarely results in any
meaningful client-centered decisionmaking. Thus, the occasional use of formal notice may
do no more than contribute to the illusion that class members participate in decisionmaking. The additional Rule 23(b)(3) requirement still may have the adverse consequences of
squelching a class action See, e.g., Eisen, 417 U.S. at 175-76. As suggested below, to the
extent that the rules ought to be changed to better reflect client-centered values, they also
should ensure that class actions be easily utilizable. The Rule 23(b)(3) notice requirement,
as construed in Eisen, undermines that objective. Any rule changes also should avoid, as
Professor Yeazell points out, the apparent conflict in the way Rule 23 now treats different
kinds of class actions. See Yeazell, supra note 7, at 1201. As a conceptual matter the decisionmaking role of class members should be the same in all class actions.
166. See, e.g., Allen v. Isaac, 100 F.R.D. 373, 375-77 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (conclusion that a
(b)(2) action in which monetary relief was sought was in reality a hybrid (b)(2) and (b)(3),
and therefore, pursuant to Rule 23(d)(2), the court could protect the due process of class
members by permitting class members to opt out); see also Bauman v. United States Dist.
Ct., 557 F.2d 650, 659 (9th Cir. 1977). But see Cox v. American East Iron Pipe, 784 F.2d
1547, 1554 (11th Cir.) (no automatic right to opt out of hybrid (b)(2)-(b)(3) at certification
stage, although perhaps at relief stage), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 274 (1986).
167. See generally H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, at 3.
168. Id.
169. See American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 952
(1974).
170. See, e.g., Hill v. Western Elec. Co., 672 F.2d 381, 390 (4th Cir. 1982); see also
United Bank v. Sun Mesa Corp., 119 F.R.D. 430, 434 (D. Ariz. 1988).
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tation by named plaintiffs. 17 1 In a (b)(3) class action, dissatisfied
class members can simply opt out, but that is generally not possible in a (b)(2) or (b)(1) action, 17 2 and those are the situations when
a court might permit (d)(2) intervention. In essence, permitting
such intervention strengthens the representation of the entire
3
class.

17

Rule 23(d)(2) also allows an unnamed class member to enter
an appearance by counsel.174 Such an appearance is explicitly authorized in Rule 23(c)(2) for (b)(3) class members, and is within
the court's discretion under (d)(2) for (b)(2) and (b)(1) cases. Putting aside for the moment that (b)(1) and (b)(2) class members
may not even be aware of the class action (since no notice is required), allowing a class member to appear (though not intervene)
may effect client-centered values,7 5 or at least help achieve more
76
client input before decisions are made on behalf of the class.1
More generally, Rule 23(d)(2) and (d)(3) raise basic questions
about a court's monitoring responsibilities. Sometime ago, the
Third Circuit referred to the court in the class action as the
"guardian of the rights of the absentees.' 7 Other courts defer to
class counsel.17 The court cannot seek out the views of class mem-

171. See, e.g., Woolen v. Surtran Taxicabs, 684 F.2d 324, 332 (5th Cir. 1982) (in resolv-

ing whether named plaintiffs are adequate representatives in a Rule 23 (b)(2) class action
and whether the class members should be permitted to intervene under Rule 24(a), the trial
court should proceed with some sensitivity to the need to have all class interests adequately
presented to the court).
172. See supra note 165.
173. See, e.g., Gatter v. Cleveland, 87 F.R.D. 66, 70 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
174. See Lamb v. United Sec. Life, 59 F.R.D. 44 (S.D. Iowa, 1973).
175. See infra notes 241-80 and accompanying text.
176. It is important to distinguish between a class lawyer's client-centered lawyering
duty to ascertain the wishes of her class clients and the class lawyer's duty to act in the best
interests of the .lass. Once the lawyer gets the client input, there may not be and need not
be unanimity among class members before the class lawyer acts. Indeed, even if ten of
eleven named plaintiffs object to an action it may still be the class lawyer's obligation to
take that action. See, e.g., Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 828 (1982). Similarly, even if a significant segment of the class generally opposes
waging a class action attack, the class lawyer may still appropriately act to seek relief which
is beneficial to all class members. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,
395 F.2d 920, 937 (2d Cir. 1968).
177. Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973).
178. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (prison conditions case)
where Judge Lasker relied heavily on the decisionmaking judgment of the class lawyer. He
was, according to Professor Hermann: the "traditional passive adjudicator." See M. Hermann, supra note 80, at 24.
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hers and try to carry out their wishes without seriously disrupting
the adversary system in class actions. As was suggested in the discussion of class action settlements1 9 and has been suggested in
other contexts,18 0 it may be quite difficult if not impossible for the
court to be both the protector or advocate of the class and an impartial adjudicator818 In any event, in the absence of ethics code
guidance, the court's open-ended monitoring authority under Rule
23(d)(2) has not yet been particularly useful in achieving the goals
of client-centered decisionmaking. The primary obligations should
be on class counsel to find out what her clients want. 8 2 Those responsibilities as set forth below should be more clearly delineated. 8s The court may then, perform its necessary but properly
limited Rule 23(d) monitoring role.
4. Communication With Class Members
The Supreme Court advanced client-centered decisionmaking
in class actions in Gulf Oil v. Bernard, 4 where it held that a trial
court may not issue orders barring communication between class

179. See supra notes 134, 138 and accompanying text (thesis of Professors Fiss and
Resnik that the courts can play too intrusive and unregulated a role in effecting class action
consent decrees).
180. Cf. Bahr v. Galonski, 80 Wis. 2d 72, 83, 257 N.W. 2d 869, 874 (1977) (in the childclient context, the child needs an "advocate" in court, and the "court cannot play that role"
in our adversarial system).
181. See Kane, supra note 8. Professor Kane asserts that a more cooperative partnership between the court and the class lawyer is both achievable and necessary to ensure
protection of the rights of class members. I am not certain that it is the court's effort to
cultivate cooperation that is crucial as much as it is the court's creation of a litigation environment which is conducive to active but manageable client participation in class actions.
As Professor Hermann wrote, regarding Judge Lasker's decision in Rhem v. Malcolm, had
the court paid more attention to the pleas of class members it "would have encouraged
improved communications" between lawyer and clients and perhaps have produced a result
more protective of class members' interests. M. Hermann, supra note 80, at 99; see also
McGriff v. A.D. Smith Corp., 51 F.R.D. 479 (D.S.C. 1971). "[I]t is not the responsibility of
the Court to sift laboriously through all the records and circumstances in order to ferret out
every possible grievant." See H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, at 2. Contra Ricciuti, supra note
18, at 861 ("the judge would also examine the feelings of the [class] members ... to determine their reaction to the settlement proposal [and the judge is the] guardian of class interests .
").
182. "Experience teaches it is counsel for the class representatives and not the named
parties who direct and manage the actions." Greenfield v. Villager Indus., 483 F.2d at 832,
n.9.
183. See infra pages 777-79 and accompanying text (including proposed rule setting
forth more clearly defined decisionmaking responsibility).
184. 452 U.S. 89 (1981).
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counsel and class members unless there is clear evidence of abuse

by the class lawyer. 185 While attorneys may abuse the class de-

vice, 188 a blanket prohibition on such communication, the Court
held, would undercut the basic class action policy of facilitating
adjudication of multiple claims arising out of the same wrongdo-

ing. 1 7 The Gulf Oil opinion did not directly address class client
decisionmaking.188
The Court did acknowledge, however, the need for the representative plaintiffs (and presumably the class counsel) "to obtain
information about the merits of the cases"' 8 9 from class members,

185. See Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 103.
186. The two kinds of abuse the Gulf Oil trial court was concerned with were: 1) solicitation of cliens, and 2) misrepresentation of status or purpose of the class action. Id. at 95.
The Supreme Court recognized that such potential abuses can occur, but concluded there
was no evidence of abuse here. See id. at 104. Regarding solicitation, the Court increasingly
has made it clear that the ethical concerns about avoiding solicitation cannot be permitted
to undermine other important policies. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434 (1978); see
also Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1924 (1988). Moreover, the potential
abuses of solicitation and misrepresentation are also possible in non-class actions. While
courts should be sensitive to the greater consequences of class action abuse, it would no
more make sense to completely prohibit class lawyers from talking to their clients than to
stop a lawyer from speaking with an individual client. That is not the way to deter abuse.
187. See Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 104. In a later case, the Ninth Circuit, relying on Gulf
Oil, reversed an order which improperly restricted communication between the class lawyer
and class members. See Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
The court stated:
[i]t is obvious that few if any of the claimants could afford private counsel. The
availability of a federal magistrate to help claimants is no substitute for an advocate
who will help claimants present their claims in the best possible light. The trial
court seems unnecessarily concerned that counsel would be overzealous in the pursuit of claims. The advocacy system is designed to correct for excesses through response from opposing counsel, rather than through court-imposed restrictions which
interfere with legal assistance to class members. The restrictions are particularly
inappropriate where class members have no other effective means to secure counsel.
Id. at 1441.
188. The Court also refrained from resting its unanimous opinion on constitutional
grounds. See Gulf Oil, 452 U.S. at 103-04. Plaintiffs' main argument was that the trial
court's communication ban violated their first amendment rights. Id. at 93. This was also
the basis of the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision vacating the ban. Id. at 98. The Supreme
Court stated, "we do not reach the question of what requirements the First Amendment
may impose in this context. Full consideration of the constitutional issue should await a
case with a fully developed record concerning possible abuses of the class action device." Id.
at 101-02 n.15. But the court later stated, "[ajlthough we do not decide what standards are
mandated by the First Amendment, we do observe that the order involved serious restraints
on expression." Id. at 103-04.
189. Id. at 101; accord Waid, Ethical Problems of the Class Action Practitioner:Continued Neglect By the Drafters of the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 27
Loy. L. REv. 1047, 1050-60 (1981) (discussion of ethical dilemmas created by absence of rules
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and to assist them in deciding whether to accept a settlement offer.
The Supreme Court might also have relied on the ethics code provisions requiring counsel to communicate with her clients and to
follow the clients' directions. Instead, the Court rested its decision
on the importance of furthering basic Rule 23 procedural policies.
Before Gulf Oil, the Manual on Complex Litigation suggested
that a class lawyer not be allowed to communicate with unnamed
class members.' Without such communication, neither informed
consent, nor client-centered decisionmaking is possible in any
meaningful sense. At least the Court now has concluded that such
communication is "presumptively proper."'191 Gulf Oil certainly
moves us closer to informed consent in class actions, even though
the Court did not affirmatively require compliance with the principles of informed consent or client-centered decisionmaking.
5. Limitations of ProceduralRules
Clients play almost no decisionmaking role in class actions because the procedural rules do not explicitly address the matter,
and also because courts have chosen not to exercise their discretionary authority under the existing rules to ensure participation
by class members. If the nature of the class lawyers' ethical obligations to the entire class were made clearer, the existing procedural
framework probably would be adequate.' 92 At least for the more
assertive judge, the discretionary authority is provided to the court
in Rule 23(d)(2) and (d)(3) to ensure appropriate recognition of
client views. The obligation of the class lawyer to solicit class
member views should be made clearer and more specific. Also, the
scope of the class lawyer's decisionmaking authority and the nature of the courts' supervisory responsibility over the class lawyer's
obligation to and relationship with the class should be clarified; all
are discussed below.

regulating manner in which class members are contacted).

190. See

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION

1.41 (4th ed. 1977).

191. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, at 216. For a discussion of why class lawyer's investigative communication with class members should not constitute improper solicitation, see
infra note 214.
192. Later in this Article, I will propose the addition of a rule to our ethics codes to
clarify the class lawyer's duties to class members. See infra pages 777-79 and accompanying
text. This should make it easier for courts to exercise their Rule 23 supervisory responsibilities for the purpose of ensuring class member participation.

1989]
IV.

Class Actions
APPLICATION OF CLIENT-CENTERED DECISIONMAKING VALUES

IN CLASS ACTIONS

The decisionmaking context in which class action lawyers operate is a difficult one. In dealing with individual clients, lawyers
are faced with a clear ethical mandate to obtain meaningful client
consent. With respect to class actions, however, there are no comparable ethical guidelines and the procedural rules seem to be premised on efficiency and paternalism with minimal concern for client choice. Yet the reality is that even if individual class members
wanted to, they could not possibly dictate the course of a class action. By trying to incorporate some but not all client-centered values into class action lawyering practices, there may be a way out of
the dilemma for the class lawyer. I set forth below a series of suggestions that, on the one hand, require the class lawyer affirmatively to seek out the views of class members both in face-to-face
meetings and otherwise and, on the other hand, expand the class
lawyer's authority to act on behalf of the class. At the same time,
the class lawyer can increase client input while informing class
members that ultimate decisionmaking responsibility rests with
the class lawyer, through the pragmatic, but, I believe, principled
adaptation of the doctrine of informed consent to class actions.
The objective is to provide clearer guidance to the class lawyer
(and ultimately to the court) by trying to bridge the gap between
client-centered decisionmaking norms and class action practice. To
that end, I propose, in Part C of this section, the adoption of a new
ethical rule embodying the norm that class action decisionmaking
authority be given to class lawyers, but only on the condition that
certain outreach steps be completed.
Class action lawyers in some ways are like public officials: both
take actions on behalf of their constituencies and both must resolve how best to acknowledge and respect the wishes of those constituents. Like an elected official, the class lawyer must reconcile
the tension filled representative impulse to act both as an instructed delegate and an enlightened trustee.19 And just as an

193. See Yeazell, supra note 7. Professor Yeazell notes that Rule 23 makes the class
representative responsible both to ask the class members for directionand to tell them. the
latter he analogizes to Edmund Burke's political theory of representation in which the representative acts not as the agent of the constituent-s hut as their enlightened trustee. See
also s upra note 165 and accompanying text.
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elected official achieves validation or legitimation through participation by the beneficiaries of the official's actions (either through
the electoral process or more personalized meetings), so too must
the class lawyer seek out class members to participate in the decisionmaking process. 194 There is a role for the individual class member to play in the class action-a role that can ensure both the
efficacy of the class action (for it is most fundamentally a procedural device to achieve efficiency and access) and the consensual
propriety of class actions. But it is not the central role that the
195
client assumes in the individual client context.
A.

Confronting Group Conflict

It is hardly surprising that unanimity will rarely prevail
among any group of individuals grappling with complex issues of
concern to them. An emotional example is the 1976 debate between Professor Derrick Bell and Nathaniel Jones, then the General Counsel to the NAACP, on the appropriate goals and means
for civil rights litigators seeking to eliminate segregated schools.'"8
NAACP Legal Defense Fund lawyers had pursued numerous
school desegregation lawsuits on behalf of classes of black parents
and children. Professor Bell argued that the plaintiffs' lawyers
were insensitive to the contrasting views of many Blacks in the various plaintiff classes who did not want desegregation and busing,
but rather better quality education. In essence, Professor Bell asserted that the class lawyers acted in disregard of many if not most
of their clients' wishes in violation of the client-centered norms
197
discussed in this paper.
This kind of an intra-class conflict, while more intense than
most, would not appear to be an unusual class situation. 9 8 Even in
a case as seemingly straightforward and innocuous as a class action

194. Unlike democratic governments, however, the majoritarian principles often are not
viable operating norms for class actions. See infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 184-94; infra text accompanying notes 196231.
196. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976), reprintedin H. KALODNER & J. FISHMAN,
LIMITS OF JUSTICE 569, 605 (1978) (text at notes 121-22); Letter from Nathaniel R. Jones to
Editors of Yale Law Journal, reprinted in H. KALODNER & J. FISHMAN, supra, at 614.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 20-63.
198. See, e.g., Rhem v. Malcolm (prison conditions case) discussed in Hermann, supra
note 80; In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir. 1982).
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alleging illegal credit card overcharging, it is almost inevitable that
there will be differences among class members. For example, some
may want maximum monetary recovery while others may want to
punish the offender. How then can the individual wishes of class
members first be ascertained and then, if conflicting, be reconciled? Most importantly, the class lawyer cannot wait until conflicts surface. Just as the effective client-centered lawyer must gently but persistently work with the totally passive individual client
to achieve client participation, the class lawyer also must affirmatively seek out class members. Professor Rhode describes the present practice of failing to solicit class member views as "see-noevil, hear-no-evil."' 9 9 Because class lawyers do little to solicit class
views, they rarely discover conflicting opinions. Some commentators have suggested that certain limited forms of notice should suffice to bring the views of class members to a court's attention.2 0 0 I
believe the class lawyer ought to conduct more face-to-face discussions with class clients and that class client involvement should
begin even before the class action is filed.
B.

Client-Centered Lawyering From the Outset of A Class
Attorney's Work

Focusing first on the pre-filing stage, let us return to our two
hypotheticals to examine how client-centered lawyering principles
might work well in advance of even the slightest indication of conflict among class members. Lawyer Greenblatt, you will recall, was
representing Jack Smith in a housing discrimination matter,20 1 and
lawyer Bradley was representing Daniel Morris in the backyard
odor, toxic tort case. 2 What should each of the lawyers do prior to

199. Rhode, supra note 6, at 1247. She does acknowledge, however, that some public
interest law firms have specific policies designed to maximize input from class members. See

id. at 1205.
200. Professor Rhode writes that in "the vast majority of cases ... some combination of
public announcements .... regular mailing [and public meetings] ... should suffice to apprise the court of significant unrepresented constituencies." Id. at 1248. Without specifying
whether she was referring to a face-to-face meeting or a personalized notice, she goes on to
recognize that "sampling or individual notice may be warranted." Id. Professor Rhode's focus is different from mine. While we are both concerned with appropriate disclosure of divergent class member views to the court, my focus is on how to bring the class member more
actively and meaningfully into the decisionmaking process of the class lawyer and not how
to ensure that the court collects more data.
201. See supra text accompanying note 64.
202. Insofar as the economics of litigation are concerned, it is highly probable that the
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filing to determine whether or not the lawsuit should be a class
action; how should that decision be made and by whom? A second
series of questions might be asked after class actions are filed with
respect to the conduct and settlement of the litigation.
1. Pre-Filing(Conflicts Not Yet Apparent)
a. Consent of Named Plaintiffs
Two broad concerns appear at the pre-filing stage: first, what
investigative steps should be taken as a matter of good lawyering
and to ensure compliance with procedural and ethical investigation
requirements; 2 3 and second, who will make the key decisions that
individual clients ordinarily make such as whom to sue, what relief
to seek, etc? While these two concerns do overlap, I will focus only
on the second-who makes the decision(s)? As a threshold matter
each lawyer must discuss the consequences of filing a class action
with the person who came to see her.20 4 In particular, the lawyer
must make clear that in a class action suit the individual client will
lose control of the action and the case may last longer and will
certainly be more complex than in an individual suit. If Mr. Smith

individual claims in both of these hypotheticals could profitably be litigated, both from the
client's and lawyer's perspective. In this respect, the hypotheticals differ markedly from
both the institutional reform case (where plaintiff seeks injunctive relief only, as in school
desegregation or prison improvements cases) and the consumer fraud case (where the
amount of each victim's loss is too small to justify an individual suit). Of course, in both
cases, as well as in our two hypotheticals, a public interest lawyer (who by definition is less
interested in fees) could bring either an individual or a class action. While the role of fees in
class actions is well beyond the scope of this Article (see, e.g., Coffee, supra notes 16, 113),
the thesis of this Article as to the desirability of more active participation by class members
is consistent with any fees theory. The issue of fees, as is the case with individual clients
(e.g., the contingent fee), is simply one of the issues to be discussed by lawyer and client(s).
203. See generally Grosberg, Illusion and Reality in Regulating Lawyer Performance;
Rethinking Rule 11, 32 ViLL. L. REv. 575, 630-33 (1987). Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is a procedural rule which requires lawyers to make reasonable inquiries
into facts and law before filing a lawsuit; the rule parallels both ethical code provisions and
generally accepted standards of good lawyering as to what any effective lawyer would do
before embarking on a litigation path.
204. "Of course, in the case of any proposed class action, it is the individual client who
must make the decision to expand the suit into a class action after a full explanation of all
of the foreseeable consequences." ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 334 (1974). Also, as with any potential lawsuit, the lawyers in both the Smith
and Morris cases must have concluded that there were valid claims; that each client wanted
to sue; and that each was fully aware of the risks, burdens and potential rewards of
litigation.
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or Mr. Morris rejects the class action proposal, then his respective
lawyer must either comply with his wishes or terminate the clientlawyer relationship. If lawyer Bradley chooses the latter course,
that concludes the matter unless some other victim of the tort
seeks his assistance. If lawyer Greenblatt decides not to represent
Mr. Smith, she still may have a live lawsuit, perhaps even a class
action. She still could file a tester claim.20 5 As a public interest lawyer, she might seek out other victims of discrimination from the
20 6
Queens complex.
Even if the two individual victims choose to be named plaintiffs in class actions, both lawyers must still evaluate the representativeness of Smith and Morris. First, each victim must, of course,
satisfy the formal Rule 23(a) requisites of typicality, commonality
and adequacy of representation.2 7 Second, even more importantly
in terms of client-centered values, each lawyer ought to be confident that the proposed named plaintiffs can articulate some of the
non-legal concerns that only clients can voice. 20 8 For example, if
Smith otherwise satisfies Rule 23(a) but is quite reluctant to express any views on the wide range of values that may be important
to victims of civil rights violations, 20 9 he may not be very well

205. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (regarding the propriety of tester suits).
206. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (supporting such action). Primus indicates
that in our hypotheticals, Greenblatt, unlike Bradley would not be seeking pecuniary gain,
and therefore would not be foreclosed from seeking out discrimination victims. See Ohralik
v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (restricting solicitation); see also MODEL RULES
Rule 7.3. The Code is more ambiguous on the subject of solicitation of class representatives
or class members: "[ijf success in asserting rights or defenses of his client in litigation in the
nature of a class action is dependent upon the joinder of others, a lawyer may accept, but
shall not seek, employment from those contacted for the purpose of obtaining their joinder."
MODEL CODE DR 2-104(A)(5). This would permit the class lawyer to talk to class members.
As to those cJass members desired as class representatives, the class lawyer could "accept"
"but not seek" employment. Further, this ambiguous direction is the same for both lawyers,
Greenblatt and Bradley. No distinction is made based on whether the lawyer does or does
not seek pecuniary again. Compare ABA Comm. On Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1469
(1981) (allowing letter to potential class members) with Informal Op. 1483 (1981) (prohibiting direct contact with class member).
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
208. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 147-53. Only the clients, ultimately,
can weigh all of the factors and determine which decision will bring the greatest client
satisfaction.
209. For example, each civil rights victim must assess the psychological consequences of
a courtroom cross-examination about the emotional impact of the original violation. Similarly, the victims should evaluate whether it is more important to obtain immediate compensatory relief, long-term equitable relief or greater punitive sanctions against the offenders. These are factors that clients must weigh whether they are individual or class clients;

Syracuse Law Review

[Vol. 40:709

suited to be a named plaintiff. As I discuss below, the class lawyers
should reach out beyond the named plaintiffs to discern class
members' views about these non-legal concerns. But, it seems both
logical and preferable that the named plaintiffs play the lead role
regarding these issues. Lawyers Greenblatt and Bradley therefore
ought to make every effort to have named plaintiffs who wish to
stay involved and who will provide meaningful client input on the
non-legal considerations.21 0
Assuming the two clients do not veto the proposed class actions, is the decision to file a class action solely that of the lawyers? As a matter of good lawyering and in compliance with Rule
11, neither of the lawyers could make class action allegations as to
typicality, commonality and other Rule 23 requirements without
first undertaking a "reasonable inquiry" to obtain support for the
allegations.21 In the discrimination case, lawyer Greenblatt should
verify the prior two complaints, preferably through in-person interviews with the bias victims, and should do some additional confirmatory investigation by seeking out the views of a sample of the
putative class. Bradley should interview other residents in the
neighborhood. This is simply good lawyering. 212 What lawyer, for
example, would want to file a class action with a single named
plaintiff, only to discover three months later that the factual circumstances of other class members, if there are any, are substantially different so that a class certification motion would be denied? If additional confirmatory information is not reasonably

and the clients should regularly give those subjective assessments to their lawyer, including
the class lawyer.
210. It is especially important in class actions that the class lawyer receive such client
input easily and regularly. In the individual client context, even if the client is reticent or
chooses not to express feelings on such non-legal concerns, the lawyer must still inform the
client and allow the client, ultimately, the chance to veto a course of action that affects the
merits of a lawsuit. Because no class client has comparable authority to restrain the lawyer's
decisionmaking, it is doubly important for the class lawyer to solicit client input.
211. See Univil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 559 (9th Cir. 19870 (holding
that plaintiffs' counsel had failed to "conduct a reasonable inquiry into whether he should
bring the class claims"); Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 600 (S.D N.Y. 1976) (where
under the prior version of Rule 11 requiring lawyer bad faith in order to trigger sanctions,
the court held that plaintiffs' class counsel had sufficiently investigated the class claims so
as to preclude the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions); see also O'Kelly, Class Actions: Proposals for New Rules of ProfessionalResponsibility, 5 LITIGATION 25 (Winter 1978) (discussing
proposal that new ethical rules be promulgated to require the class lawyer to conduct an
appropriate pre-filing investigation before making class allegations).
212. See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
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obtainable prior to filing, that of course is another matter.213 If
Greenblatt interviewed the two prior complainants and perhaps
two other persons who are probable discrimination victims and if
Bradley talked to individuals in four or five different households,
both lawyers may reasonably confirm the validity of the various
class action allegations relating to the patterns and practices of
discrimination. 1 4
But what if three of the four wanted nothing to do with any
litigation for any one of a variety of reasons and the fourth wanted
to sue for himself rather than in a class action? It is at this point
when the decisionmaking problem emerges. Unlike the ordinary individual client situation, there is no "client" in the discrimination
case who can be informed and then consent to the decisions. The
"client" is a group and as is true with most groups, there are differing views among group members on most issues. Thus, the lawyer
must decide. It may very well be that, based on the investigation
and outreach, the lawyer takes steps (to narrow the class definition, establish sub-classes or obtain separate lawyers for conflicting
groups) that reflect disparate class views,21 5 but the decision to

213. See, e.g., Kamen v. AT&T Co., 791 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1986).
214. It i3 possible that an argument could be made that such investigative efforts constituted improper solicitation. See supra note 206. But at least three key points distinguish
this kind of information-seeking from the Ohralik solicitation of a client and bring it closer
to Primus.See generally Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus,
436 U.S. 412 (1978). First, lawyers Bradley and Greenblatt already have clients who want
these lawyers to represent them; the only question is, therefore, whether they should do so
in individual claims or class actions. Second, because there are class actions being contemplated (and investigated), by their very nature they are more similar to the public interest
efforts in Primus than the pure pecuniary gain in Ohralik. Third, Ohralik upheld the rule
against solicitation because it served "to reduce the likelihood of overreaching and the exertion of undue influence on lay persons, to protect the privacy of individuals and to avoid
situations where the lawyer's exercise of judgment on behalf of the client will be divided by
his own pecuniary interest." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 461. In the class context, when a class
lawyer talks to members of the putative class under my proposed rule, it is after the named
plaintiff has been secured. This kind of solicitation, therefore, is precisely for the opposite
purpose of the solicitation prohibited by Ohralik-to prevent overreaching and solitary and
paternalistic decisionmaking by the lawyer. Also, the pre-filing investigation requirements
apply to class action lawyers as well as lawyers representing individuals. If Bradley and
Greenblatt did not conduct the outreach efforts to putative class members, I do not believe
they could cc.mply with the Rule 11 investigation requirements for Rule 23 class action allegations. See Waid, supra note 189, at 1050-60. With respect to a class lawyer's communication with members of a certified class, Professor Wolfram concludes: "[tihere seems little
reason, other than partisan advantage, to resist a rule that would leave the class lawyer free
to contact members of the class for any purpose ....
C. WOLFRAM, supra note 91, at 789.
215. For example, in the school desegregation litigation which is the subject of Profes-
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take those steps must initially be made by the lawyer and not the
clients. There is no direct legal support that confirms the propriety
of this course.
b.

Similar Amorphous Clients

The class action, however, is only one of a number of contexts
in which the "client" is an amorphous one. There are several client-lawyer situations that are comparable in the sense that a "client" cannot make the usual client decisions. While no easy answers
emerge, it is useful, for example, to look briefly at two of these
situations where lawyers and commentators have struggled to develop sensitive client-centered lawyering skills: the child-client2 1
and the mentally incompetent client.2 17 Class action lawyers similarly must try to adjust their practices to reflect this relatively new
recognition of the importance of client participation.
i. The Decisionmaker for a Child
Consider the child-client. As between the child-client and the
lawyer, who make the decisions? What is the role of the lawyer?
While these questions have received some attention,1 8 it is clear
that complete deference to the wishes and decisions of the childclient, as if the child were a competent adult, certainly is not the
answer. Both the ethics code and the courts have attempted to
provide some guidance to the child's lawyer but broad grants of
discretion still entrust the lawyer with very difficult questions to
resolve.2 19 For example, when a lawyer represents a child in a custody proceeding, reconciling the obligation to zealously advocate
on behalf of the child and the obligation to promote the best inter-

sor Bell's critique, a good client-centered class lawyer should have discerned certain of the
key class conflicts prior to filing. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing
Professor Bell's critique). While that recognition may have resulted in narrowing of class
definitions or establishment of sub-classes (possibly with separate counsel), it does not mean
that the class lawyer must cease being a strong advocate or the person who makes at least
the initial decisions on behalf of the class.
216. See generally Long, When the Child is a Client: Dilemmas in the Lawyer's Role,
21 J. FAM. L. 607 (1983); Strauss, supra note 58.
217. See generally Tremblay, supra note 11.
218. See supra note 216 and the sources cited therein.
219. For example, Rule 1.14(a) directs a lawyer to maintain a "normal client-lawyer
relationship" with a child-client "as far as reasonably possible," but Rule 1.14(b) permits
the lawyer to seek appointment of a guardian if the "lawyer believes the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest." MODEL RULES Rule 1.14(a), (b).
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ests of the child is quite challenging if not frustrating, and is usually performed on an ad hoc basis.2 20 Typically, the lawyer essentially muddles through, trying to be sensitive to the wishes of the
client and yet acting in a manner that the lawyer alone concludes
is consistent with the best interests of the child.2 2 ' Often the lawyer also is the guardian and therefore the ultimate
decisionmaker.2 2 2
One response to this somewhat vaguely defined dual role of
the lawyer is to separate the two tasks by giving the advocacy role
to a lawyer and the best interests responsibilities to an independent guardian to act as the child's alter ego. Recent draft model
legislation incorporated this approach.2 23 Rather than appoint a
single lawyer to act as both guardian ad litem and lawyer for the
child, the court would first appoint a guardian ad litem and then a
lawyer to represent the child through the guardian.22 4 Alternatively, a separate guardian ad litem would be appointed only if the
child's lawyer recognized a conflict between the advocacy and best
interests roles. Either of these approaches would provide a compe-

220. See, e.g., duPont v. Southern Nat'l Bank, 771 F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating
that the lawyer performs a "hybrid role" advising the court and a party), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1085 (1986) ; Allen v. Allen, 78 Wis. 2d 263, 267-68, 254 N.W. 2d 244, 247 (1977) (the
lawyer has a "concurrent obligation to infant" and to make an objective report to court).
See generally Long, supra note 216 (advocating a general rule which urges sensitivity to the
individuality of each child's situation).
221. See MODEL CODE EC 7-12. "If a client under disability has no legal representatives, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the
client." Id. See generally Schwartz, A New Role for the Guardian Ad Litem, 3 OHIO ST. J.
DISPUTE RESOL. 117, 162-63 (1987) (in many ways the child's guardian performs both factfinding and advocacy functions in trying to represent the child's best interests to the court,
similar to the role of a mediator).
222. See Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974) (stating that the lawyer appointed
as a guardian ad litem is given authority to "prosecute, control and direct" the litigation).
223. IJA-ABA JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES (1980); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STANDARDS FOR ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
(1980).
224. Ordinarily, when a child is involved in a non-custodial disposition proceeding, the
child's parent or permanent guardian works with the lawyer representing the child. Only if
there is a conflict between one parent (or guardian) and another parent or the state, and the
child, would the lawyer for the child have to resolve whether to seek the appointment of a
guardian ad litem. See Long, supra note 216, at 620. Cf. Ad Hoc Committee of Teachers v.
Greenburgh Union Free School Dist., 873 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1989) (teachers in a school for
emotionally disturbed children were appointed guardians for the children in a lawsuit alleging racial discrimination in the educational institution because the childrens' parents or permanent guardians were unable or unwilling to act to vindicate the rights of the children).
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tent client to instruct the lawyer. In essence, a traditional lawyerclient relationship would be established between the guardian and
the lawyer. But adding a representative for the child would increase the expense and complexity of any child custody proceeding, and some commentators have criticized this approach as impractical and unwise.22 5 Moreover, it would not necessarily
eliminate possible conflicts of interest. If a dispute arose between
the infant and the guardian, it might even exacerbate conflicts
with the lawyer.2 2
The analogy in the class context would be to give named
plaintiff(s) a fiduciary or trustee responsibility similar to that of a
guardian ad litem for a child, or alternatively, appoint a separate
guardian ad litem to represent the class. The class lawyer then
could be directed by the class guardian just as the child's lawyer
might be guided by the guardian ad litem.22 7 This division of class
action decisionmaking responsibility could probably be made
under existing procedural and ethical rules.228 But two key differences distinguish the class action model from the child-client
model. First, the class is not a unitary client; the child is. While
neither generally can give a single set of coherent instructions, a
class guardian would have a much more complicated task than the
child's guardian ad litem in communicating with class members,
ascertaining the wishes of class members, and then synthesizing
those views. The use of a guardian would simply add a layer to the
decisionmaking machinery and may very well push the class clients
even further away from those who will make decisions for them.

225. See Long, supra note 216, at 614, n.22.
226. See Hazard, supra note 76, at 15.
227. See, e.g., Century Brass v. International Union, 795 F.2d 265, 275 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 107 S. Ct. 433 (1986); In re Amatex, 755 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir. 1985). With respect to the use of a guardian for the class at the settlement stage of class actions, see
generally Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a GuardianAd
Litem During Pre-Trial Settlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1985). Aside from
the additional cost problem presented by such an appointment, the author's proposal does
not address client-centered decisionmaking values. See id. at 331. It simply would substitute
a court appointed third party to assume the decisionmaking ordinarily performed by the
class lawyer; the role of the class clients and the nature of the division of decisionmaking
responsibilities between them and the lawyer and the guardian would remain vague and
undefined. The guardian idea, nevertheless, may be a useful device in class action situations
when conflicts become open and notorious.
228. Id.; see also Miller v. Mackey Int'l, Inc. 70 F.R.D. 533, 535 (S.D. Fla. 1976) (guardian appointed for class because of conflict of interest between class members and class lawyer over size of fee).
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Second, as a matter of historical reality, named plaintiffs in class
actions usually have not been able to or were not inclined to assume such a trustee role but rather have deferred, often almost
completely, to the decisionmaking of the class lawyer.2 29
But even in the child-client context, while the use of a separate guardian ad litem remains a theoretical choice, it simply is not
used that often because of the added expense and complexity, and
because it may not succeed in avoiding the conflict of interests for
which it was designed.2 30 The more prevalent model is the lawyer
who tries to be respectful and responsive to the child-client's
wishes but ultimately accepts responsibility for making the decisions the lawyer thinks are in the best interests of the child2 31 It is
just such a less neat and multifaceted role that also seems to be
the behavioral norm for class lawyers. Both as to the lawyer representing a child and the class action lawyer, it may also be the most
appropriate model.
ii.

The Decisionmakerfor a Mentally Incompetent Client

The decisionmaking role for the mentally incompetent client
is similarly vague. Once again, while the Model Rules at least include a rule explicitly dealing with the "disabled client," Model
Rule 1.14, neither the rule nor the comment on the rule fully resolve all of the complex dilemmas facing the lawyer who represents
an incompetent client.2 32 Professor Tremblay suggests that a lawyer representing a client who may not be competent, basically has
four choices: 1) disregard the indications of incompetence and implement the client's wishes even if they seem preposterous; 2) seek
the appointment of an independent guardian to speak for the client; 3) make all decisions for the client (lawyer as "de facto"
guardian); or 4) try to explain and then persuade and cajole the
client (notwithstanding the mental disability) to make choices
which the lawyer thinks are more consistent with the client's apparent interests.2 33 Tremblay thoughtfully concludes that the first

229. See Kane, supra note 8, at 393-94.
230. Cf. Long, supra note 216, at 614 n.22; Hazard, supra note 76, at 27.
231. See Long, supra note 216, at 639.
232. The most closely analogous provision in the Model Code of Professional Responsibility is EC 7-12 (see supra note 221 and accompanying text) and it offers similar, although
somewhat vague, guidance to the lawyer regarding the circumstances under which an incompetent should assume all or any of the decisionmaking responsibility.
233. See Tremblay, supra note 11, at 519.
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choice is unconscionable if it means a lawyer simply watches while
the client hurts himselL 23 4 The second choice has such severe intrusive consequences (a guardian could take over all of a client's
decisionmaking responsibilities) that it should only be pursued in
the most extreme circumstances." 5 He asserts the third
choice-that the lawyer simply make all decisions for the client-is
a gross usurpation of the client's right to self determination.3 6
Professor Tremblay concludes, therefore, that the preferred choice
is for the lawyer to try to persuade the client to act in what seems
to be the client's best interests; this conclusion is reached with full
awareness of the necessity of sensitivity on the lawyer's part if coercion, manipulation, 3 7 or even unduly paternalistic persuasion is
to be avoided.23 8
The Tremblay analysis is instructive here because in the class
action context the class "client," as such, is similarly incapable of
assuming decisionmaking authority, although for different reasons
of disability than the typical incompetent individual client. In class
actions, the client is amorphous and often not capable of speaking
with one voice. Indeed, the cacophony of voices or the absence of
any voice could be analogized to the incoherence or extreme passivity of a mentally disabled client. The class action lawyer's basic
choices are similar to the ones Tremblay outlines. The lawyer
could disregard any conflicts among class members and simply follow the loudest voices, despite the possibility that what they suggest is irrational or tends to sacrifice the interests of quieter class
members. On rare occasions, courts have appointed a guardian for
the class (Tremblay's second choice) .2 39 A guardian is generally
seen as redundant, however, because the named plaintiffs supposedly play such a role. Further, a guardian simply adds a participant to the decisionmaking process. The class lawyer, named

234. See id. at 517.
235. Cf. Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerationsin Representing Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 630 (1979). In
the case of more severely disabled clients such as one who is profoundly retarded, this option may be more appropriate and less avoidable than in the more ambiguous cases focused
on by Professor Tremblay.
236. See Tremblay, supra note 11, at 570-76.
237. See generally Ellman, supra note 11; Lehman, supra note 68.
238. See Tremblay, supra note 11, at 577-83.
239. See Miller v. Mackey Int'l Inc., 70 F.R.D. 533, 535 (S.D. Fla. 1976). See generally
Note, supra note 227, at 326-32.
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plaintiffs and class members remain. If anything, the decisionmaking authority of the class members would be diminished. The class
action lawyer could simply do what she thinks best without taking
any consultative steps (Tremblay's third option). The inappropriateness of such a course is by this time obvious. And the fourth
choice-to try to persuade the "client class" to take a particular
course of action-seems inapposite because of the absence of a unitary client. Who is it that the class lawyer would try to persuade?
In some ways, then, it is more difficult to practice client-centered
lawyering in class actions than it is when representing an incompe40
tent client.1
c.

Outreach to Members of Putative Class

i. Rationale
Returning to our toxic tort case, assume that lawyer Bradley's
investigation discloses that neighbors of the Morris family also

have noxious odors in their backyards and similar physical ailments. If Bradley files a class action without consulting these other

members of the putative class, the filing decision is not one that
reflects client-centered values. Conversely, if Bradley polls the 499
other homeowners (with a eighty percent response rate) and learns

that 40% oppose the filing of a class action or even that 60-70%
oppose a class action, that does not necessarily mean that a class

240. There are several other client-lawyer situations where the client is either amorphously defined or where it may be difficult for a lawyer to discern client choices. For example, from whom does the lawyer for the corporation take direction: the Board of Directors,
the chief executive officer, the shareholders, or the employees? Under the Model Rules, the
corporation lawyer represents the entity (MODEL RULES Rule 1.13) and not the several distinct interests underlying the corporation. See G. HAZARD & W.R. HoDEs, supra note 79, at
241-42; see also Karmel, supra note 86. This position has been criticized as unrealistic because the lawyer will have a relationship with individuals, and therefore the loyalty should
be to the board and not simply the entity. See Jonas, Who is the Client?: The Corporate
Lawyer's Dilemma, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 617, 622 (1988). Who are the clients for government
lawyers? Attorneys general should look to their public agency clients for decisionmaking on
merits questions and not to the lawyers' conception of what is in the public interest; if there
are conflicts between different agencies, special counsel should be sought. Josephson &
Pearce, To Whom Does the Government Lawyer Owe the Duty of Loyalty When Clients
are in Conflict, 29 How. L.J. 539 (1986). But see Feeney v. Commonwealth, 373 Mass. 359,
366, 366 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (1977) (the attorney-general may appeal a decision even if his
client, the Governor, directs him not to appeal; as chief law officer, the attorney general
"assumes primary control over the conduct of litigation" and "is not constrained by the
parameters of the traditional attorney-client relationship").
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action should not be brought; nor does such a plebiscite always
constitute an effective form of client-centered decisionmaking. Majoritarianism is not a solution to the class action decisionmaking
dilemma, both because the will of the majority may disregard valid
minority concerns241 and because the vote itself may not be representative or informed.242 Also, as a practical matter it would be
impossible for a class lawyer to repeatedly put to a vote the many
litigation questions that arise in a class action.
In the housing discrimination case, for example, assume that
lawyer Greenblatt speaks with six randomly selected members of
the putative class of 250 discrimination victims and five of the six
tell her they want nothing to do with the lawsuit. Does that mean a
class action should not be filed? Not necessarily. Assuming the five
victims confirm the facts supporting an inference of discrimination, the reasons for their desired noninvolvement might include,
among others, a lack of time, fear of reprisal, cynicism, or resignation. None of this information should discourage Greenblatt from
filing a class action. Indeed, it is precisely this kind of a situation
for which the class action was intended as a remedy-namely,
when there is evidence of repeated violations of the law but the
victims for one reason or another cannot or will not seek recompense. In this context then, were Greenblatt to file a class action
with but one or two named plaintiffs, her decision would, I believe,
be consistent with both client-centered lawyering values and class
action doctrine. And yet indisputably, it is lawyer Greenblatt who
is making this decision for the 500 class members. 4 Are the last
two sentences contradictory? I do not believe so. There are steps
that both lawyers Bradley and Greenblatt could take, even at this
pre-filing stage, that would reflect respect for the client-centered
values of autonomy and dignity of the individual, as well as the
importance of client assessments of non-legal considerations. And
they could be done in a way to ensure meaningful client participation in the decisionmaking. Clearly, neither Greenblatt nor Bradley

241. See, e.g. Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828
(1982).
242. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1232-42.
243. This assumes that the one or two named plaintiffs understand and consent to their
role as class representatives. It also assumes that Greenblatt obtained certain other information from the interviews of five class members (relating to their views in non-legal consequences) confirming the desirability and propriety of a class action.
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could fully replicate the kind of client-centered lawyering which
they might do in non-class action situations. But each could communicate with class members collectively and individually. They
also could let all of the potential class members know that these
efforts were being made.
If the rule I propose 2 4 were to be implemented, Bradley would
have to interview a sample of the other 499 homeowners-perhaps
five, possibly more depending on the distinctions among the homeowners. During those interviews, Bradley should make every effort
to have the putative class members weigh such non-legal factors as:
the negative consequences on the reputation of their neighborhood
if it is confirmed that a toxic dump is under their homes, 245 the
diminution in the value of their homes from the publicity even if
the legal claim is successful, the divisiveness a lawsuit is likely to
have on the community, the time and emotion involved in the proposed lawsuit, and the possibility that they would have to move
out of their homes.24 6 Regarding the use of a class action, Bradley
also should talk to his class member sample about the additional
complexity of a class action and the greater amount of time it may
take. Most importantly, Bradley should try to discern any actual
or potential conflicts among the class members, especially as to
those class members whose injuries or losses are likely to be most
247
severe.
In the discrimination case, Greenblatt similarly should pursue
with those six randomly selected class members a variety of nonlegal considerations. Do the class members fear retaliation? Do
they feel that the Queens apartment complex is sufficiently desirable so that it is the best place to wage battle? Are they motivated
enough to provide the minimum cooperation necessary to wage an
effective class action? These are questions the clients should

244. See infra pages 777-79 and accompanying text (text of proposed rule).
245. See Schmitt, Anger Lives in Canal's UninhabitableZone, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29,
1988, at B1 (description of some of the many problems faced by the residents of Love Canal
in response to toxic waste problem).
246. Id.; see also Schmitt, Axelrod Says 220 Love Canal Families Can Return, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 28, 1988, at B1.
247. To the extent that the class claims affect class member interests that are substantial in financial, social or political terms, the class lawyer should make even greater efforts to
seek information and input from class members. See infra page 778 (section 2.4(a)(5) of the
proposed rule).
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address. 248
If the class lawyers did not seek this information, or sought it
and disregarded it, it would be at the expense of client-centered
values. Likewise, if the lawyers did not solicit class member views
on the whole range of litigation issues, their lawyering decisions

would be less well informed.2 49 The quality of the lawyering prod-

uct would suffer. The pre-filing communication with putative class
members could be through the kind of sampling interviews discussed above or through more impersonal polling or questionnaire
methods. No single set of results, however, should be dispositive.
This is where the fiduciary responsibility of the class lawyer
comes into play. That lawyer must synthesize all of the various
forms of information. And the class lawyer outreach is necessary
even in the absence of any sign of conflict or divisiveness among
putative class members. Indeed, a principal reason for affirmatively
soliciting class member views is to discover as early as possible if
there are conflicts which would make a class action inappropriate.
It also is pragmatic to bring class members into the decisionmaking process early in the litigation and on a continuing basis. By
doing so, the class lawyer is likely to have an easier time obtaining
class member acceptance of the ultimate resolution.2 50
What other pre-filing issues should be covered in this outreach
effort by the class attorney? Consider, for example, the relatively
simple question of whether the discrimination or toxic tort cases
should be filed in a state court or federal court (assuming the
choice were available); or, whether pre-trial tactics should include
every conceivable discovery and motion practice or a more economical and efficient version of a pre-trial discovery plan. Under
an authoritarian model, the lawyer would simply tell the individual
client of the attorney's decision.2 51 Under a client-centered theory,

the lawyer would skillfully elicit information from the individual

BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 147-53.
249. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 87, 100-04. One of Professor Spiegel's principal arguments for informed consent is that lawyers require input from clients if proper lawyering
decisions are to be made. Another-that the client plays a constraining role on the lawyer-is much less transferable to the class context.
250. While the empirical evidence in support of this proposition is limited to individual

248. See D.

clients, the logic seems equally applicable to class actions. See D. ROSENTHAL. supra note 14,
at 63-93.
251. See Spiegel, supra note 11, at 123-26. These are examples he uses of issues for
clients to decide.
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client, often "non-legal" data such as the client's "values or feelings.

'252

The lawyer would give the client information about the

number of months or years it might take in each court; whether
the judges or juries are different or might produce different results
in the two court systems; and whether the costs would be different.
Similar questions would be posed to the client on the cost and
quantity of discovery. The limitations of interrogatory answers versus deposition testimony would be explained, along with the possibility of monetary fines if the court concluded there was frivolous
motion practice. Such data is the prerequisite to informed consent.2 53 Providing this information in a clear, comprehensible and

non-condescending fashion is integral to the skill of counseling and
in turn to client-centered lawyering.
In the Smith and Morris cases, the lawyers could not possibly
conduct interviews covering all of these issues in this manner with
all potential members of the two classes. Nor should they ever be
expected to do so. Each lawyer, however, could easily conduct interviews as to these and similar issues, with a sampling of putative
class members. While a critical client-centered component would
be missing-namely, actual decisionmaking by the client 25 4-other
important benefits of client-centered lawyering are achievable. In
addition to getting feedback on the tactical and procedural choices,
it might produce the kind of good data that only skillful clientcentered interviewing can produce. Assume, for example, that lawyer Bradley interviewed family members from three other households (a total of thirteen individuals) regarding the odor and its
consequences, discovering that, while the ailments of these other
persons varied significantly (from eye burning to headaches), one
of the thirteen had precisely the same kind of cancer as the elevenyear-old Morris girl.255 Having obtained such information, lawyer

252. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 21-37, 104-23; see also MODEL RULES
Rule 2.1.
253. Regarding the requirement that lawyers provide enough information to the client
to make an informed decision, see MODEL RULES Rule 1.4.
254. When a class lawyer meets with class members, and in any written notices to class
members, the lawyer must make it clear that individual class members do not and cannot
control the class action.
255. Among other things, discovery of this information about the vastly different ailments suggests very serious problems about causation, and, in particular, whether there is a
common question of fact tying the odor to the ailments of the various residents. Thus, the
information may preclude the propriety or wisdom of a broadly defined class action. Cf.
Mertens v. Abbott Laboratories, 99 F.R.D. 38 (D.N.H. 1983). On the other hand, the newly
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Bradley is obviously in a much better position to act on behalf of a
putative class or to establish sub-classes-indeed, even to define or
redefine the class-than had the outreach not taken place. As self
evident as this may seem, the client-centered goal of simply getting
full and accurate information is often more easily stated than
achieved.25
Very specifically, there are two ways to facilitate class member
participation in decisionmaking of the sort just described. 257 The

first is to encourage or require the class lawyer to use various techniques and procedures to reach out to class members. The second
is to require the class lawyer to maintain certain records reflecting
those outreach efforts. This in turn would facilitate judicial monitoring of the class lawyer's compliance.258
ii. Class Lawyer Steps
The lawyer's information gathering methods should include
collective and individual contacts with class members. Thus, public
announcements, group meetings, regular mailings, written polls or
questionnaires, and written or published notices should be used to
whatever extent possible and appropriate. The class lawyer should
also conduct selected meetings with individual class members, using all of the available interviewing and counseling techniques that
are used for individual client-centered lawyering 2 59 There need not

obtained data on a second cancer victim may strengthen the desirability of a class that is
limited to cancer victims.
256. See D. BINDER & S. PRICE, supra note 11, at 48-52, 112-18.
257. This Article concludes that the promulgation of a new ethical rule would achieve
this goal. See infra pages 777-79 and accompanying text (text of the proposed rule). With
respect to the need for revising the procedural rules, there probably is enough discretionary
authority in Rule 23(d) for the federal courts to ensure compliance with the suggested
changes in the ethical rules. One revision of Rule 23 that has been proposed elsewhere,
however, may be appropriate here as well. The change would make the notice requirement
less rigid as to (b)(3) but more demanding as to (b)(1) and (b)(2). Such a revision would be
completely complimentary to the changes proposed in this Article. See Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action Improvements, ABA, 110 F.R.D. 195,
206-08 (1986).
258. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 240.
259. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Professor Rhode suggests that the
expense of individualized contacts probably is prohibitive in most cases. I would reverse the
presumptions and urge that a sampling of interviews with individual class members be conducted unless the class lawyer can demonstrate that it is not possible. If actual interviews
are not feasible, class counsel might find it useful to role-play a class member in simulated
interviews.
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be any iron-clad rule as to the requisite number of direct or indirect individual or group contacts between the class lawyer and
class members. 260 The key point to emphasize is the adoption of

the principle that client communication and client input are integral to the performance of the class lawyer's responsibilities.
All class actions are not the same. Logically, therefore, the extent to which the class lawyer should solicit class member input
should vary based on some reasonable set of criteria. Three standards seem appropriate to assess the adequacy of a lawyer's outreach efforts: the degree of intrusiveness of the lawsuit into the
privacy of class members, the financial impact, and the importance
of non-legal factors. 6 ' Perhaps the most important factor is the
first, the degree to which the class action affects matters that intrude upon the lives of class members-the more intrusion there is,
the more input and involvement that is needed from class
members.
For example, toxic gas fumes entering the homes of the Morris
family and their 499 neighbors, and causing illness and perhaps
death, is about as invasive of the privacy of the victims as the underlying cause of a potential class action might be.262 In contrast,
consider a class action alleging a Truth-in-Lending Act violation
that results in a credit card overcharge of $1 per month per customer. Less client involvement can be expected in this case than
we would reasonably expect in our toxic tort case. The Smith housing discrimination case probably lies somewhere in the middle of
the two above mentioned examples. There is much more of an encroachment of their rights to be free of violations of the law than
the credit card violation, but less of a personal trespass than the
case of infiltrating gas fumes. 263 Ironically, as noted previously, the

260. I have purposely refrained from suggesting any numbers or percentages as to the
minimum number of contacts or interviews necessary to satisfy this outreach requirement
because the numbers probably should vary substantially depending on the size and nature
of the class action. The crucial point is that the outreach obligation be recognized and then
carried out. As with all aspects of class actions, the court has oversight responsibility regarding compliance. Class counsel record keeping requirements should facilitate this compliance
review.
261. See infra pages 777-79 (section 2.4(a)(5) of proposed ethical rule).
262. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A). This provision of the Federal Rules enables individual class members to assert that their particular interests are so important and so unique as
to outweigh any benefits from a class action. See also H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, § 4.29, at
332-35.
263. The school desegregation cases probably are closer to the toxic tort case on the
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procedural rules now demand more of the class lawyer in terms of
notifying class members in the credit card case (likely a Rule
23(b)(3) class action) than in the housing discrimination case
(more often a (b)(2) class action).264
The second suggested standard, the financial impact of the
class action, similarly brings to mind the Rule 23(b)(3)(A) criteria
for determining when class certification is appropriate.2

65

The rule

states that one of the "matters pertinent to the findings" that a
(b)(3) class action is "superior to other methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy" is: "(A) the interest of
controlling the prosecution or defense of
members in individually
266
separate actions.

Typically, when class members have large dollar claims, such
as in a mass disaster situation,267 their desire for individual control
is to maximize their recovery. This is often enough to defeat the
class action. 6 8 Likewise, the more significant the monetary impact
on individual class members the more input a class lawyer should
seek from class members. Indeed, it is just such increased communication between class lawyer and class members that may lead to
the conclusion that a (b)(3) class action is inappropriate. This is
269
not necessarily a bad result.

invasion of privacy spectrum. As to each housing discrimination victim, the illegal incident
is a single act barring someone from obtaining a desired unit. Theoretically, the victim,
though emotionally scarred, can seek and obtain housing elsewhere, possibly in an integrated area. In the school case, however, the illegal acts and their consequences may have
been recurring over a long period of time, and even more importantly, the remedies of busing or improved quality to local schools will have to be lived with for years to come. Though
the school segregation victim conceivably could move to another area, the disruptiveness to
the victim is much greater than that suffered by the homeseeker who can seek housing
elsewhere.
264. See supra note 257 and accompanying text; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2),
(b)(3).
265. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A).
266. Id.; see also supra note 262.
267. See, e.g., Daye v. Commonwealth, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972);
Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
268. See, e.g., Causey v. Pan American World Airways, 66 F.R.D. 392, 399 (E.D. Va.
1975).
269. If greater communication with, and involvement of, class members demonstrates
that the individual interests of class members are in irreconcilable conflict, then the class
should not be certified as originally defined. Currently, Rule 23 notice requirements facilitate a class member's opting out for personal reasons only for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The class action decisionmaking standards suggested in this Article
would apply to all class actions.
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Finally, I propose a highly subjective criterion, the importance
of non-legal factors as one indicia of the amount of input a class
lawyer should seek from class members. If the lawsuit affects very
private matters,2 70 or highly emotional issues, 7 1 the class lawyer
must make a vigorous effort to obtain class member views. Though
it may be easier to apply this standard in some cases2 7 2 than
others,2 73 it remains useful as an aid to the class lawyer who is
making decisions on the desired amount of class member input.
The class lawyer should maintain records of all of the outreach
efforts she pursues. Those records may then be the basis for complying with any reasonable reporting requirements that a court
might institute. Disclosure of the results of the outreach efforts
need not take place, unless of course, the information necessitates
further steps by the class lawyer, such as a request for sub-classing
or the appointment of separate counsel.
iii. Judicial Steps

There are at least three kinds of actions that courts might
take to effectuate a new client-centered class action ethical rule.
First, by word and deed, courts must communicate to class lawyers
that differences of opinion or dissension among class members

need not result in the death of a class action. Denial of class certification or decertification should not necessarily follow the disclosure of conflict. Rather, there are a number of much less ominous

270. For a discussion of several family law class actions raising issues of a highly private
nature, see Paulsen, Family in Law Review, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1101 (1986), particu-

larly the discussion on Thomas v. City of Los Angles, No. 000572 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles
Co. 1979) (class of battered women seeking relief against police department), and Mack v.
Rumsfield, No. 85-6184 (2d Cir. 1985) (class of single mothers contesting policy precluding
armed forces enlitment unless custody of child relinquished)).
271. See, e.g., Smothers, Judge Seals Verdict as Trialin Suit Against Klan Ends, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at A18, col. 1 (class action against Ku Klux Klan members for disrupting civil rights demonstrations; two of the named plaintiffs sought to withdraw at the
conclusion of a jury trial because they decided it was "improper to seek money damages
from Klan members"); see also Bell, supra note 196 and accompanying text.
272. For example, in the consumer credit class action in which plaintiffs allege a failure
to make required disclosures, the non-legal considerations generally seem less consequential.
See, e.g., Ingram v. Joe Conrad Chevrolet, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 129 (E.D. Ky. 1981).
273. In consumer fraud class actions where part of the dispute arises from alleged faceto-face misrepresentations, the victims may have a strong personal and subjective involvement in the prosecution cf the class action. Here, it may be more difficult to discern the
non-legal considerations of the class members. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 94 Cal.
2d 796, 484 P.2d 964 (1971).
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ways for the class lawyer and the court to respond to conflict.174
Much freer use of sub-classes, for example, is one antidote to
class differences. 5 If necessary, separate counsel could be sought
for different sub-classes. Allowing class members to "appear" in
contrast to permitting them to intervene, may be an appropriate
way to accommodate different views.27 Of course, intervention is
available and the standards for its use should be clarified and
probably eased up.2 77 Within limits, therefore, the class action
should accommodate divergent views, provided that the class law278
yer is given adequate authority to act for the class.
By firmly establishing the class lawyer's responsibility to collect and synthesize the views of class members, the class lawyer
has an additional incentive to seek client input, even if it uncovers
some conflict, because the class lawyer's fiduciary decisionmaking

274. See Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77
Nw. U.L. REV. 492, 515-20 (1982); see also Rhode, supra note 6, at 1251-62. Cf. Kane, supra
note 8, at 408 (regarding the need for clarification of the class lawyer obligation to disclose
conflicts).
275. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 587 F. Supp. 1358 (C.D.
Cal. 1985). It should be noted that sub-classes usually are less necessary in (b)(3) class actions where class members may opt out. In (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions, the use of subclasses may be the only way to accommodate moderate class conflict.
276. The "appearance" device is explicitly provided for only as to Rule 23(b)(3) class
actions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The notice in such a class action shall provide that "(c)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel." Id. 23(c)(2)(c). This is a procedure by which class members may
participate "through counsel if-they are dissatisfied with the adequacy of their representation by the class representative but do not wish to assume the responsibilities associated
with intervention." H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, at 306; see, e.g., Milne v. Berman, 384 F.
Supp. 206, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S.
577 (1976).
277. Contra United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 987 (2d
Cir. 1984). Intervention was denied because potential intervenors had failed to establish
that there was "inadequate representation" of the class. Rule 24(a)(2) (intervention as of
right) was narrowly construed when the government was the plaintiff suing to enjoin water
pollution and four environmental groups sought to intervene.
278. There clearly is a limit to the desirable number of spokespersons in a class action.
In her article, Professor Rhode cites, quite appropriately, the Los Angeles school desegregation case as an example of pluralism gone awry-a trial with "as many as twenty-four to
twenty-eight attorneys." Rhode, supra note 6, at 1227 (referring to Bustop v. Superior
Court, 69 Cal. App. 3d 66, 137 Cal. Rptr. 793 (1977) (reversing denial of intervention pursuant to a state statute similar to Federal Rule 24.)) Professor Rhode quotes the trial judge
describing his role "as somewhat akin to a trainer in the middle ring of a circus." Id. Regarding the use of experts or third parties to facilitate the litigation of class actions, see
Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciaryor Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CM. L. REv. 394, 395-98 (1986).
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responsibility would be expressly recognized under my proposal.
Thus, it is assumed that differences among class members exist,
and that the class lawyer resolves the disputes and then acts on
behalf of the class. Only if the conflicts were deep and could not be
surmounted, would certification be denied or decertification ordered. Otherwise, lesser remedies such as those mentioned above
would be used.
Second, courts may require class lawyers to report in some
fashion that they have sought class member input. This need not
be burdensome to the lawyer or the court. For example, the class
lawyer could briefly describe her outreach efforts in the motion papers seeking class certification. The same thing could be done at
the time approval of a settlement is sought. Depending on the nature of the class action, reports might be requested at other times
as well.27 9
A final supportive step that courts could take is to reward the
effective client-centered class lawyer with appropriate fees that
recognize the additional time and effort necessary to effectuate cli280
ent-centered lawyering.
2. Post-Filing (Pre- and Post-Class Certification)
These concepts of client contact should be followed as much
after, as before, the class action is initiated.2 8 1 Currently, however,
when there is seeming acquiescence among class members, there is
no obligation on the class lawyer under existing ethical or procedural rules (other than the (b)(3) notice requirements) to solicit
the views of class members. Rule 23(a)(4) simply requires "adequate" representation.2 2 If no class member objects, and if the asserted class position seems reasonable, there apparently are no decisions which conclude that a lawyer's representation is inadequate
for failure to affirmatively seek out class views. Neither the ethical

279. At a minimum, class lawyer outreach efforts and the concomitant report to the
court would be required under any proposal prior to settlement of a class action. See infra

page 779 (section 2.4(c) of proposed ethical rule). None of these reports, however, at any
stage of the class litigation, need disclose confidential information or work product. Rather,
the reports simply would indicate that the class lawyer had taken various information gathering steps.

280. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1250.
281. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 8, at 204-27.
282. See FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(a)(4).
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nor the procedural rules address this ostensible non-conflict situation in class actions.
A principal goal of the solicitation of information is to provide
class members with a sense of participation.21 3 The manner of so-

licitation, therefore, should be conveyed to the class members so
that they are persuaded of the randomness and fairness of the individual meetings, and of the integrity of the class lawyer's absorption of the information thus ascertained. s4 To do this, the class
lawyer should use the same skills used for one-on-one client-centered interviewing and counseling. An important caveat is for each
class member to be informed that, though each is a client, his
views are not determinative. Rather, each individual is providing
critical input to the lawyer who ultimately will decide. 25 This disclosure will avoid any misrepresentation to class members;
an inte28 6
gral component of effective client-centered lawyering.
Professor Bergman has argued that the way for a class action
lawyer to honor client-centered values, is to take steps to ensure
that the class members organize so that the class may speak with a
unitary voice to the class lawyer.2 87 In this way the client-lawyer

relationship in class actions may proceed as it should in all situations. But, I believe this suggestion begs the question. It assumes
that all classes may be organized, a highly questionable assumption.28 It also assumes that the class lawyer will have no role to

283. Other goals, of course, are to solicit class member views on non-legal considerations and to confirm the class nature of the wrong and the appropriate class relief, or, conversely, to discern divergent or conflicting interests and propose necessary corrective steps.
284. Absent class members are likely to be more amenable to acceptance of the ultimate results if they are told at an early stage, and later as well, that a certain number of
class members were chosen at random to speak with class counsel; that their names are
Miller, Jones, etc; that the class lawyer did talk to these representative class members; and
that the class lawyer sought to incorporate the views of these representatives in the actions
taken on behalf of the class. In essence, this is the way in which class member participation
(direct and representative) would legitimate the actions which the class lawyer takes on
behalf of the class. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
285. The class lawyer may also want to talk to others in connection with any litigation
that could have a large impact on society. This aspect of the responsibilities of the class
lawyer has been much discussed and is beyond the discussion of this Article. See Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
286. Misrepresentation by the class lawyer to a class member can easily result in manipulation or exploitation by the lawyer. Cf. Ellman, supra note 11, at 747-48 (omissions by
a lawyer can be a form of manipulation).
287. See generally Bergman, supra note 81.
288. For example, how would a class lawyer begin to organize a four or five million
member consumer fraud class? Even if a class could be organized, that then raises the ma-
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play in mediating the inevitable disputes in any class, or in informing the court of such disputes so that the court may order any of
the appropriate remedial steps discussed in this paper. Just as it
seems likely that there will be differences among class members, it
seems unavoidable that at some point in the conduct of a class
action, the class lawyer will have to weigh the various views and
make a decision in the best interests of the class.
One final observation is appropriate regarding settlement procedures. Too often, class settlements are negotiated with little if
any input from class members. Ordinarily, in the case of an individual client, negotiation should proceed on behalf of the client
only after thorough counseling takes place.2s 9 The same principle
should apply in class actions. Thus, the class lawyer should obtain
input from class members before and during any negotiation process that might lead to a proposed consent decree. 2 10 Typically,
class members become involved only at that point when a completed agreement is formally presented to class members in compliance with Rule 23(e) notice requirements. 29 1 The values underlying client-centered lawyering call for class member participation
at an earlier point.9 2
C.
1.

The Class Action Lawyer

Need for Realistic Ethical Rule

In certain practical and very critical ways, client-centered
lawyering is not possible in class actions. Most particularly, the
consent of each class member rarely, if ever, is obtainable. What is
possible is that the class lawyer's fiduciary responsibility to the
group can be clarified so as to replace any distorted impressions
that the class lawyer must have an individual client-lawyer rela-

joritarianism issues noted above. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text. If sixty
percent of a class in a school desegregation case favors busing, that does not necessarily
resolve a conflict of interest with class members who favor other remedies.
289. See generally Gifford, supra note 11.
290. I have attempted to implement this norm in section 2.4(c) of my proposed rule,
infra page 779. See generally Ricciuti, supra note 16.
291. See FEE,. R. Civ. P. 23(c).
292. A similar point was made in another field, planning. The late Paul Davidoff asserted that greater public participation in the planning process would enable the planner to
make more rational and enlightened policy decisions. See Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism
in Planning,31 J. AM. INST. OF PLANNERs, No. 4 (Nov., 1965).
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tionship with every member of the class. 29 3 The clarification should

give express decisionmaking authority to the class lawyer. The
counterweight is the suggestion set forth above that the class lawyer be required to affirmatively solicit input from class members.
The objectives of these two changes are: to provide more guidance
to class lawyers; to reflect greater respect for client-centered values; and to preserve the strength and vitality of class actions.29
These suggestions are not likely to lessen conflicts in class actions,
nor lesgen the pressures on class lawyers to settle and obtain fees
rather than maximize the benefits to the class.295 Instead, the goal
here is a modest one: accept the reality of the limited role of class
clients, but firm up that role by revising the applicable rules to

293. Unless the class member is deemed not to be a "client," the only theoretical way to
apply the existing informed consent requirements to class actions is to adhere to the proposition in the text-namely, that the class lawyer would have to obtain each class member's individual consent. As noted in the first paragraph of this Article, this generally is
impossible, and therefore, would destroy class actions. See, e.g., Mandujano v. Basic Vegetable Prods., Inc., 541 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1976). At least in part due to the court's application
of the ethics code informed consent requirements, the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court's
approval of a class action settlement; i.e. since class members did not consent, the settlement could not be acceptable. Id. at 836. This way of reconciling consent and class action
requirements would undermine the efficacy of class actions.
294. It should be noted that the number of class actions has declined substantially.
Whereas 3,061 class actions were filed in 1975, and 1,568 in 1980, only 610 were filed for the
year ended June 30, 1987. See Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7, col. 3. A number of reasons have been offered; perhaps the most
persuasive is that lower fee awards have reduced the incentives to class lawyers. Whatever
the explanation, however, it is important that any changes, such as those proposed in this
Article, not accelerate that decline. With this crucial factor in mind, the suggestions in this
Article should not make it more difficult for lawyers to file and maintain class action. Indeed, it is hoped that the additional clarity with respect both to the duties and the authority of the class lawyer, should make it easier for class lawyers.
295. There is no empirical evidence in support of the proposition that application of
client-centered lawyering to class actions will necessarily lessen conflicts, nor even make it
easier to resolve the conflicts. It is even possible that conflicts will be discovered that would
not otherwise have been uncovered, and that the result would be to make a class action
unmanageable or, at a minimum, more complicated and time consuming. But that need not
necessarily be the case. A similar argument often is made with respect to the use of clientcentered techniques with individual clients-namely, that it is too time-consuming. When
one considers the diminished possibility of later conflicts with and among class clients as a
result of the earlier and ongoing communication with the class, the supposition that clientcentered values will unduly complicate class actions is debatable. There certainly are enough
examples of endless conflicts and wasteful and excessively time-consuming lawyering in
class actions where the principles of client-centered decisionmaking were not being followed.
See, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48, 70-78 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 751 F.2d 562, 600-01 (3d Cir. 1984). Therefore, it seems at least arguable that
client-centered lawyering in class actions cannot make the situation any worse.
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reflect that reality.
Numerous courts have already recognized the fiduciary role of
class lawyers. 9' The procedural and ethical rules, however, have
not yet incorporated this principle, and the result is both a lack of
clarity as to how class lawyers are to relate to class clients, and a
mixed record, at best, of carrying out client-centered lawyering values. Whereas the Model Rules of Professional Conduct now have
separate rules delineating the lawyer's responsibility to an "Organization as Client" 297 and a "Client Under a Disability, '298 and even
a new provision reflecting the increasing use of lawyers as
mediators 2 9s neither the Model Rules nor the Code of Professional
Responsibility has any comparable provision with respect to class
actions. That is the gap I suggest filling. There ought to be a rule
that reflects both the unique function of class actions and the important, if not central, role of clients in the class lawyer-client
relationship.
2. Proposed Ethical Code Provision
Using the Model Rules of Professional Conduct as the context,
I propose that a new rule be added to the lawyering roles part of
the Model Rules.300 It would read:
Rule 2.4

296. The class lawyer "serves in something of a position of public trust. Consequently,
he shares with the court the burden of protecting the class action device against public
apprehensions that it encourages strike suits and excessive attorneys' fees." Alpine Pharmacy v. Chas, Pfizer, 481 F.2d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir. 1973). "[N]o one class member's interests
are ever represerted with 'undivided loyalty': counsel's loyalty is necessarily owed to the
goals shared by the class as a whole." Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, 673 F.2d 798, 835
(5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J. dissenting), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1082 (1982).
297. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.13.
298. See id. at Rule 1.14.
299. See id. at Rule 2.2. This rule and the accompanying comment are intended to
facilitate a lawyer's representation of different clients (with their consent) whose interests
are partially or totally in conflict.
300. Part II of the Model Rules now contains rules for the lawyer as an advisor (Rule
2.1), the lawyer a3 an intermediary (Rule 2.2) and the lawyer whose advice may be relied on
by third parties (Rule 2.3). See MODEL RULES Rule 2.1 - 2.3. My class action rule would be
Rule 2.4. See Waid, supra note 189, at 1075 (where the author proposed the following new
ethical rule: "[tihe lawyer representing a class of individuals in a class action owes a primary
duty of loyalty to members of the class defined by the original pleadings filed on behalf of
the class, until such definition is amended by leave of court."). While this suggestion is an
improvement on the current absence of any guidance, it does not address the client-centered
lawyering concerns raised in this Article.
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Class Action Lawyer
In connection with the representation of a plaintiff class, a
lawyer shall:
(a) prior to filing a class action:
(1) comply with all applicable pre-filing reasonable investigation requirements.
(2) survey the views of the putative class members, to the
extent feasible, by:
A. interviewing a reasonable sample of representative
class members;
B. using questionnaires or polling techniques to the extent appropriate and consistent with maintaining the
support and confidence of the proposed class representatives to obtain information from or about class
members;
C. seeking the views of such class members on: i) such
relevant non-legal considerations as the moral, economic, social, psychological or political consequences
of particular courses of action that class members
might take; and ii) after explanation, the implications of class representation and the advantages and
risks involved.
(3) make reasonable efforts to select the most representative
class members to assume the role of named plaintiffs, by:
A. determining their willingness to consult with the
class lawyer;
B. assessing their ability to articulate their views and
desires, taking into account the reasonableness of
such an expectation for a particular class.
(4) resolve preliminarily whether there are conflicts of interest among putative class members and the class lawyer, that
necessitate:
A. establishing sub-classes;
B. soliciting other counsel to represent any one or more
sub-class;
C. representing to court, on filing, that though the class
lawyer has determined a class action is appropriate,
there are conflicts among class members about which
the court should be aware.
(5) determine the extent to which class member views shall
be surveyed in accordance with sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule,
by:
A. evaluating the degree of possible intrusiveness in the
lives of class members from the class action
litigation;

19891

Class Actions
B. assessing the potential financial impact on class
members from the class action;
C. evaluating the relative importance of non-legal considerations on the decisions to file, maintain and settle the class action.

(b) after filing a class action complaint:
(1) solicit the views of a sample of class members on those
issues as to which a lawyer would be obliged to keep an individual
client informed and from whom consent would be obtained under
these Rules.
(2) use such techniques and criteria in maintaining contacts
with class members as are generally set forth in sub-paragraph (a)
of this Rule.
(c) prior to notifying class members of a proposed final settlement
pursuant to class action notice provisions, survey class members
as to their views on potential settlement terms in accordance with
the methods set forth in sub-paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule.
(d) maintain records reflecting the lawyering efforts made pursuant to this Rule to inform class members and encourage their participation in the conduct of the class action and submit to the
court on request a report setting forth what outreach steps were
taken.
(e) make decisions for and act on behalf of the best interests of
the class, but only after obtaining input from class members in
accordance with this Rule and after resolving any conflict questions in accordance with sub-paragraph (a) of this Rule.
As stated above, there is both recent and older precedent for
such a separate rule. Rule 2.2 "Intermediary," for example, is a
new Model Rule governing the role of a lawyer who represents two
or more clients with conflicting interests, each of whom consents to
the common representation. 3s0
Divorce lawyers may act as

301. Rule 2.2 Intermediary states that:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implications of the common representation, including the advantages and risks involved, and the effect on
the attorney-client privileges, and obtains each client's consent to the common
representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make
adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is
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mediators for the husband and the wife under this provision. 2
While the drafters of the rule commented that "there was no direct
counterpart to [Rule 2.2] in the [Code] ,' 303 Professors Hazard and
Hodes later wrote regarding this rule that "it could be argued that
this Rule's treatment of the lawyer as intermediary is superfluous,
for every obligation this Rule places on a lawyer can be found in
some other important rule.

30 4

Nevertheless, both commentators

defended the soundness of the drafters' decision to include this
305
new rule in the "differing roles" section of the Model Rules.

It

would be equally sound and probably less redundant to add a new
and separate rule for class action lawyers.306
From the vantage point of clients, there are now separate ethical rules for the organization as a client and the client with a disability.3 0 7 Thus, it also would be logical to include a separate rule

for class action clients whose circumstances are unique and different from those of other clients. My proposed rule approaches the
task from the lawyer's perspective; it therefore suggests placement
in the section relating to differing lawyer roles, but it might also be
placed with the Rule 1 client provisions.
The purpose of this rule is to fill the gap between the existing
ethical codes that speak generally of informed consent and contemporary class actions where the notion of consent has little
meaning. In addition to providing guidance to the class lawyer, it

unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each client concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so
that each client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, or if
any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to represent any of the clients in the matter
that was the subject of the intermediation.
MODEL RULES Rule 2.2.
302. See generally Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107, 119-23 (1982) (discussion of some of problems faced by lawyers in
this role).
303. MODEL RULES Rule 2.2 comment (1983). Cf. MODEL CODE EC 5-20 (1980).
304. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 79, at 310.
305. See id.
306. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor); see also
MODEL CODE DR 7-103 (1980).
307. See MODEL RULES Rule 1.13, 1.14.
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should enable courts to conduct more meaningful monitoring. Although class lawyers may have to do more work under this rule,
the clear intent is that class actions not be discouraged. Indeed, it
is realistic to predict that, ultimately this rule will make it easier
(though not necessarily less time consuming) for class lawyers to
conduct class actions.30 8 With this addition to the ethics code, I do
not believe it is necessary to amend the procedural rules.3 0 9 The
rule is intended simply to direct the class lawyer, as is the case for
lawyers generally, to pay heed to the values underlying informed
consent and client-centered decisionmaking. Importantly, it calls
on the courts to recognize that it is the class lawyer and not any
individual named plaintiff or class member who ultimately makes
the litigation decisions for the class.
3. Dual Lawyer-FiduciaryRole Not Unusual
It is not unusual for a lawyer to perform the dual role of an
attorney and a guardian or trustee of some sort. Several examples
were discussed above. The appointment of the lawyer as a "guardian ad litem" for a child or an incompetent is one such "hybrid"
role in which the lawyer is advocating for the client, yet "advising
and assisting the court" to reach the right result.3 10 The lawyerguardian ad litem fulfills these "concurrent obligations" and, with
respect to the client who is incapable, makes all of the decisions for
the client, subject to the court's oversight of the lawyer's conduct.3 11 The lawyer "prosecutes and controls" the litigation.3 21 The
class action lawyer performs a similar "officer of the court" function,3"3 which ought to be recognized explicitly and likewise monitored by the court. With the kind of recordkeeping requirements
suggested above, that monitoring responsibility should be greatly
facilitated.

308. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
309. Rule 23(d)(2) and (3) provide enough discretion to the courts to oversee compliance with the proposed ethical rule. See supra notes 163-83 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 218-40 and accompanying text. E.g. duPont v. Southern Nat'l
Bank, 771 F.2d 874, 882 (5th Cir. 1985). The guardian ad litem is an "officer of the court" as
well as an "advisor" to a party. Id.
311. See Allen v. Allen, 254 N.W.2d 244, 247 (Wis. 1977).
312. See Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974).
313. See Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 390 (Alaska 1977); cf. Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1916 (1988) (Court held it was not inconsistent with lawyer's duty to
client to also require lawyer to advise court why an appeal would be frivolous).
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Performance of the dual role of fiduciary and lawyer for the
fiduciary is a common occurrence. In New York, for example, the
statutes specifically authorize a lawyer to act both as the executor
and the lawyer for an estate, 14 or both the trustee and the lawyer
for a trust.315 While it is recognized that such a fiduciary might act
in a way to favor her or his interests, the applicable law simply
"forbids the disloyal transaction" and provides appropriate remedies in the event of a breach of that fiduciary duty.316 These clientless situations have been sanctioned explicitly in the statutes and
the case law by approving separate fees to the lawyer-fiduciary for
legal work versus fees to the same person for executor, guardian or
trustee work. 1 7 Even when substantial discretion is given to the
fiduciary-for example, a trustee carrying out a charitable trust to
support community housing efforts-there is nothing to preclude
the lawyer from performing both the legal and trustee functions. 8
In these cases, as with the child or the incompetent, the lawyer
performs legal services without the benefit of very much client direction or, perhaps, without any client input at all.
There are several other contexts in which the lawyer acts either without a client or with a client but where the lawyer is the de
facto decisionmaker. Criminal prosecutors, for example, act in the
name of the "People"-in the public interest.3 9 Attorneys general

314. See N.Y. SURE. CT. PROC. AcT. LAW § 2307 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1989); M.
& C. RADIGAN, NEW YORK STATE ADMINISTRATION 369 (1986). But see MODEL CODE
EC 5-6 (prohibiting a lawyer from unduly influencing a client to select the lawyer as
executor).
315. See N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT. LAW § 2309 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1989). The
same rule applies in Florida, Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey and Wisconsin. See de Furia,
Jr., A Matter of Ethics Ignored: The Attorney-Draftsman As Testamentary Fiduciary, 36
U. KAN. L. REv. 275, 308 (1988). For reference to the particular statutory citations for each
of the states just listed, see id. at 308 n. 174.
316. See E. BOGERT, TRUSTS 342 (6th ed. 1987)
317. See, e.g., In re Von Hofe, 145 A.D.2d 424, 535 N.Y.S.2d 391 (2d Dep't 1988); In re
Allen's Will, 280 A.D. 868, 114 N.Y.S.2d 325 (2d Dep't 1952). The broader issue of whether a
lawyer can both draft a will and name herself or himself as an executor or lawyer for the
estate, or both, has elicited criticism of the permissive ethical rules that allow these dual or
multiple functions to be assumed by a single lawyer. See, e.g., de Furia, supra note 315, at
299-304.
318. See supra notes 315-16; cf. E. BOGERT, supra note 316, at 476 (trustee can exercise
discretion about how best to carry out charitable purposes).
319. See MODEL RULES Rule 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor); see also
MODEL CODE EC 7-13: "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the
usual advocate... (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he also may
make decisions normally made by an individual client. .. "
TURANO
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likewise may act on behalf of the public in bringing (civil as well as
criminal actions) or defending actions, though they may also represent specific individuals.3 2 ° The class action lawyer acts on behalf of class members in a manner that is conceptually quite similar. While the two types of government officials are either elected
or appointed, and are obliged by statute to carry out certain law
enforcement duties on behalf of the public for extended periods of
time, the class lawyer's "public" is limited to the members of the
defined class and his or her authority to the duration of the lawsuit. Despite these differences, both the public officials and the
class lawyers have similar representative duties-to serve the in32
terests of their constituent groups.
The development and use of the term "private attorney general" to describe the class action lawyer is a semantic confirmation
of the similarity between the lawyering duties of the attorney general and the class lawyer.3 22 Like the situation with public attorneys general, the private attorneys general are the decisionmakers
and the "clients" typically have played little or no role in the initiation or conduct of such actions. 2 3 The role of the private lawyer
is viewed as a "necessary supplement" to government enforcement
activities;l" necessary because of the limited resources available to
public enforcement of the law.2 5 Whether the private attorney
general label is used interchangeably with class action attorney or

320. See MODEL CODE EC 7-14; see also Smothers, Attorney General's Role Is In Question in Georgia, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1987, at A20, col. 5. A dispute arose as to whether the
Georgia State Attorney General could sue a state agency to require them to comply with an
open meetings law after having previously counseled the agency on the meaning of the law.
See also supra note 240.
321. See Yeazell, supra note 7 (Professor Yeazell concludes it is the common interest of
the group members and not their consent which legitimizes class representation). Cf. G.
HAZARD, supra note 10, at 58. Quoting a phrase used by J. Brandeis, Professor Hazard describes the lawyer serving more than one client in "a single transaction" as "representing
the situation." He goes on, however: "It is not easy to say exactly what a lawyer for the
situation' does ... this role may be too prone to abuse to be explicitly sanctioned." Id. at 67.
322. The apparent genesis of the use of the term, "private attorney general," is New
York State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943)
(J. Frank recognized the right of Congress to confer standing on private persons to "vindicate the public interest").
323. See generally Coffee, supra note 16. The problems with the private attorney general "follow from the necessarily weak control that the client can exercise over the attorney.
•.." Id. at 229-30.
324. See, e.g., J.D. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
325. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
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used only to describe non-class action injunctive suits, the relative
non-role of the clients is the same.3 26 At least as to its applicability

to class lawyers, that situation would be ameliorated if the suggestions made here were adopted and the clients were given a more
defined, though limited, role.
The public-private distinctions are not unimportant, however,
and the analogy, therefore, between private class lawyers and government lawyers has definite limitations. The most important difference is that the prosecutor and the attorney general are subject
to removal (by the electorate or an elected executive) if their public trust responsibilities are not properly performed. The class action attorney is subject only to the oversight of the court. In stark
contrast to the elected or appointed public official, the class lawyer
is self-appointed. While the suggested recordkeeping requirements
should make judicial monitoring a little easier, that oversight is of
a different order from the accountability to the public of government officials. Nevertheless, and notwithstanding all of these differences, it is still useful to analogize the role of the class lawyer to
that of the attorney-general. The distinctions should be recognized
not by prohibiting a class lawyer from ever acting like a private
attorney general, but rather by imposing clear obligations on the
class lawyer as well as limitations on the lawyer's authority to so
act. 27 That is what the suggestions set forth in this paper attempt
to do. And I believe that the judicial regulatory responsibility over
class lawyers which is necessary to effectuate these suggestions
need not be any greater nor more demanding than it is now-only

326. As previously noted (see supra note 323), Professor Coffee has identified as the

most distinctive feature of the private attorney general model and the feature that makes it
an "inadequate and counterproductive" way to serve "social interests" and the "private enforcement of the law," the fact that "as a practical matter he is unconstrained by the dictates or interests of a specific client." Coffee, supra note 16, at 229.
327. Cf. General Tel. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980) (Court held that the EEOC was not
the same as a private party bringing a Title VII discrimination class action and, therefore,
various of the Rule 23 procedural requirements were not applicable to the EEOC). Similar
distinctions could be effectuated (either legislatively or through legislative acquiescence to
ethical code changes) that would give class lawyers limited governmental type authority to
act in the public interest. See also Note, Citizen Suits Under the Clean Water Act, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 813 (1986) (discussion of the citizens' role in initiating enforcement of water
pollution laws); Comment, Qui Tam Action: The Role of the Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20 UCLA L. REV. 778 (1973) (discussion of the statute which provides for the
recovery of part of any penalties recovered by the government in actions initiated by private
individuals against persons allegedly violating the law).

a little better defined.3
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4. Feasibility of Class Lawyer as Fiduciary
In response to the suggestion that the class lawyer be recognized as a trustee acting on behalf of the class members, there
have been two basic and somewhat contradictory lines of criticism.
The first I would characterize as the realist critique-that such a
role is a practical impossibility. While viewing the class lawyer as a
fiduciary is "unobjectionable in concept, that role definition has
frequently proved unworkable in practice.

3
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A differing criticism

is one concerned with the lack of accountability, or even the lack of
standing because there are no real clients. 330 In contrast to the
realists, the proponents of this critique seem much less concerned
with the maintenance of effective class actions.3 ' Both criticisms
should be addressed.
The realist asserts that the practical, -financial or ideological
self-interest of the class lawyer is so overwhelming that it is nearly
absurd to talk of a fiduciary obligation to the class as the predominant behavioral motivation for the lawyer. In particular, the class
lawyer's interest in or need for a fee is so great that it would be a
delusion to expect the class lawyer to put the interests of class
members above his or her interest in remuneration.3 2 To the extent a class lawyer uncovers and discloses dissension or divergent
interests among class members, she risks decertification of the
class (and the resulting loss of a large fee), wasteful diversion of

328. I agree with the proposition that it would be desirable to avoid increasing the extent to which courts must regulate class actions. Some of Professor Coffee's suggestions to
better correlate fee incentives with the interests of class members would help; nothing in
this Article is inconsistent with those proposals.
329. Rhode, supra note 6, at 1205; see also Kane, supra note 8. Professor Kane recommends a closer and more cooperative working partnership between the court and the class
lawyer to compensate for the obstacles to ensure that the class lawyer truly act in the interests of all class members.
330. See, e.g., Breger, supra note 91, at 349.
331. Professor Breger observes that while the assumption of the federal rules is that
classes are homogenous, in fact they often are quite diverse, and conflicts arise. Id. at 350.
The class lawyers then resolve the conflicts without any accountability to clients. He concludes, therefore, that public interest lawsuits must be limited "to instances in which there
are no conflicta," unless separate counsel is obtainable for the divergent interests. Id. at 354.
Cf. Bergman, supra note 81 (Professor Bergman, however, seems more concerned with the
lawyer's usurpation of the client's right to make decisions affecting the client's values).
332. Coffee, supra note 113, at 683-84, 724. Because the class lawyer is much more an
entrepreneur than a fiduciary, class actions encourage collusive or extortionate settlements.
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resources, a diminution of control-or all of the above. Further, it
is argued, the class lawyer may be precluded from representing certain opposing viewpoints for ideological reasons, either of a personal or an institutional sort 33 3 And finally, the usual method of
surmounting client-lawyer conflicts-namely, disclosure followed
by informed consent-is simply not available in class actions because each class client cannot possibly assent.334
To begin with the last point, I certainly agree. Indeed, that is
the thesis of this article. Ordinary notions of client control, let
alone client participation in decisionmaking, are not viable in class
actions. But it is precisely for that reason that a clearer explication
is necessary of the class lawyer's trustee responsibilities. Two fundamental reasons for the doctrine of informed consent are: 1) to
provide a constraipt on the lawyer and thereby ensure loyalty to
the client; and 2) to ensure that ultimate decisions are made
knowledgeably-that the lawyer gets the necessary factual input
from the client. That information also is the basis for the lawyer
appropriately counseling the client.3 35 The outreach suggestions
discussed above are an attempt to satisfy those two rationales, at
least to some extent.
The present disinclination of class lawyers to disclose conflicts
(because too often it could lead to decertification), would change if
they were given incentives to disclose. 3 6 For example, merely
knowing that decertification would be an extremely drastic and seldom used response to conflict, would assist in inducing the class
lawyer to disclose conflict. Thus, by requiring the class lawyer to
take certain investigative steps and then possibly report to the
court that the steps were taken, the potential explosiveness of a
conflict should be defused. With respect to any ideological bias of
the class lawyer, the class lawyer simply must be required to disclose it in some way to class members if it will affect how the lawyer intends to carry out her fiduciary responsibilities. To the ex-

333. A frequently used example of ideological pressures on the class lawyer are the institutional policies of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in favor of integrated schools. Class
lawyers also are affected by criticisms of their lawyering skills which might follow the unsuccessful break-up of class actions. See Rhode, supra note 6, at 1210-12.
334. See id. at 1212-15.
335. See Spiegel, supra note 11.
336. Under my proposal, the existence of disagreement among class members would not
necessarily lead to the termination of the class action. See supra notes 274-80 and accompanying text.
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tent the class lawyer would allow personal interest in fees to
override her fiduciary duty to the class (and thus not disclose class
conflicts to the court), the situation would be no worse than it is
now when there are no recordkeeping or reporting constraints imposed on the class lawyer. And finally, part of the class lawyer's
express responsibility would be to act as a trustee for the class in
seeking to appropriately reconcile the divergent interests of the
class member beneficiaries. This decisionmaking role now would be
both explicitly stated and central to the class lawyer's fiduciary
responsibility.
Those critiques concerned with the lack of accountability focus on the absence of the central role of the client. There is much
less if any concern for the continued efficacy of the class action as
a procedural device. The myth of client control should be exposed,
says one critic, and strict client accountability should be the norm
regardless of the procedural, political or law enforcement consequences. 3 37 This position may seem deceptively pure in its allegiance to client control. But it is lacking in candor in failing to
recognize that many class members might be deprived of access to
judicial relief if class actions are made unworkable. It also fails to
recognize the numerous other situations when there is little if any
client control over the actions of the lawyer. The suggestions here
are an attempt to bridge this gap-maintain effective class actions
but increase the respect paid to client-centered principles.
Were a new ethical norm established for the class lawyer, such
as the one proposed here, it would not eliminate class action conflicts. Nor would it end the necessity for judicial monitoring. It
would, however, more accurately reflect the reality of the predominant decisionmaking role of the class lawyer, but it would do so in
a way that acknowledges the importance of client-centered values.
And it would clarify operationally what it is that the class lawyer
ought to be doing, and what the respective decisionmaking roles of
client and lawyer are.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is a delusion to suggest that the "client" is the decisionmaker in class actions. That simple truth ought to be recognized and then incorporated into operational guidelines pursuant

337. See Breger, supra note 91.
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to which a class lawyer can pay proper respect to client-centered
decisionmaking principles. In doing so, the new rules must also pay
heed to the crucial importance of effective class actions. At one
and the same time the class lawyer should be called on to reach
out and ascertain the views of all class members (even the weak or
reticent ones) and then, after synthesizing the information obtained, unilaterally act in a trustee capacity for all class members.
The court's monitoring role will be simplified to the extent these
guidelines are clarified.

